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I. Introduction

In 2012, stockholders challenged a remarkable 96% of M&A
transactions with a value greater than $500 million and 93% of
deals with a value greater than $100 million,1 a stunning upsurge
since 2005.2 The vast majority of these lawsuits settle, largely
with disclosure-only accords,3 but where monetary benefits are
involved the average payment has increased in the last few
years.4 A mainstay argument by plaintiffs is that the selling
company’s board of directors failed to maximize the sale price5—
in other words, the board breached its so-called Revlon duty. The
“Revlon” in Revlon duty, of course, refers to Revlon, Inc. v.
1. ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1 (2013), http://www.cornerstone.com/
files/upload/Cornerstone_Research_Shareholder_Litigation_Involving_M_and_A
_Feb_2013.pdf. Note that this study only surveyed M&A transactions involving
publicly held target companies. Id. Transactions involving privately held target
companies tend to face fewer challenges since those transactions are generally
not publicly disclosed and the target companies generally have more closely held
stockholder bases. Id.
2. Professors Matthew Cain and Steven Davidoff report that in 2005,
approximately 39% of transactions with a value greater than $100 million were
challenged. MATTHEW D. CAIN & STEVEN DAVIDOFF, A GREAT GAME: THE DYNAMIC
OF STATE COMPETITION AND LITIGATION 3 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1984758 (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). In a preliminary January, 2014 update of their study that
includes data for calendar year 2013, Professors Cain and Davidoff found that in
2013 97.5% of deals valued at $100 million or more attracted litigation.
MATTHEW D. CAIN & STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, TAKEOVER LITIGATION IN 2013 1–2
(2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 1, at 6 (stating that 81% of all
settlements required additional disclosures only). This too is a reversal from a
few years earlier when most Delaware settlements involved a monetary
payment. Id. For a listing of disclosure-only settlements approved by the
Delaware Chancery Court in the first quarter of 2013, see Morris James LLP,
Corporate and Fiduciary Litigation Group, THIS MONTH IN DEL., at ii (Apr. 2013)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. Veronica E. Rendon et al., Recent Trends in M&A and Corporate
Fiduciary Litigation, LAW 360, at 1 n.8 (last updated May 20, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/442043/print?section=classaction (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 1, at Highlights (“Plaintiff
attorneys typically allege that the target’s board of directors violated its
fiduciary duties by conducting a flawed sales process that failed to maximize
shareholder value.”).
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MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,6 a landmark 1986 ruling by
the Supreme Court of Delaware.7 Revlon was one of a handful of
takeover-fueled decisions during the 1980s that fundamentally
redrew the map governing director duties in the M&A setting.8
Given the high volume of M&A activity in the United States,9 and
the frequency of court challenges to that activity,10 Revlon has
become an assumed and accepted part of the legal landscape for
both the practicing M&A bar and the judiciary.
Yet, in 2014, Delaware’s contemporary Revlon jurisprudence
has come under fierce scholarly attack. Professor Stephen
Bainbridge has severely criticized several chancery court
decisions for misapplying the supreme court’s core teachings on
Revlon,11 a critique Professor Mohsen Manesh counters is itself
misconceived.12 Professor Frank Gevurtz has leveled a more
fundamental broadside against Revlon, contending it lacks any
defensible policy rationale, and advocating its outright
abandonment.13 Vice-Chancellor Travis Laster, by way of
6. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
7. See id. at 176 (reviewing the validity of “defensive measures in the face
of an active bidding contest for corporate control,” and affirming the Delaware
Court of Chancery’s holding that directors must seek to obtain the best available
price for shareholders).
8. Other key decisions during the 1981–1990 decade include Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v.
Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
9. See David A. Westenberg et al., United States: 2013 M&A Report,
MONDAQ (May 20, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/240092/M+A+
Private%20equity/2013+MA+Report (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (revealing an
increase in M&A activity in the United States despite a decline in global deal
volume in recent years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3333–35 (2013) (asserting that the chancery court has
misread the triggering events for the Revlon duty).
12. See Mohsen Manesh, Defined by Dictum: The Geography of RevlonLand, 59 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2308704 (last visited Dec.
20, 2013) (arguing to refute the thesis of Professor Stephen Bainbridge) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1485, 1545 (2013).
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contrast, recently argued for extending Revlon’s enhanced
scrutiny standard to all negotiated transactions, thereby
substantially broadening the reach of the doctrine.14
We have an altogether different perspective than the bar,
judiciary, and other scholars. We argue that, given its
intersection with another important arc of recent Delaware
decisional law, Revlon today is, ex post, essentially a constrained
remedies doctrine, applicable only pre-closing for possibly
granting nonmonetary sanctions.15 We arrive at our novel thesis
concerning Revlon as the natural conclusion of examining the
following questions: Does Revlon apply only if a sales transaction
is entered,16 or does it also govern sales efforts by boards that
utterly fail even to produce a transaction? If an attempted sale
failed due to a flawed process, might the directors nonetheless
have breached their Revlon duty because of how poorly they
conducted the selling effort? Maybe, in other words, the reach of
Revlon is actually far broader than many appreciate. Probing
these neglected issues through a remedies perspective offers a
useful, if ironic, lens on where exactly, as it turns out, the
overblown Revlon doctrine stands today.
This Article takes up these important but overlooked
questions for several reasons. First, there is broad language in
Delaware decisional law suggesting a Revlon duty to maximize
shareholder value in the no-deal context, but as of yet there is no
clear-cut holding on this basic issue.17 After all, many sales
efforts fail. What legal significance does that hold if failure stems
from deficient director conduct? Second, resolution of the no-deal
issue is vital for directors, and lawyers counseling them, because
directors recurrently confront difficult decisions in managing
strategically critical sales transactions. For example, can the
14. J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is A Standard of Review: Why It’s True And
What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 33 (2013).
15. Infra Part IV.
16. We leave to one side, because it is not the focus of this article, the
ongoing uncertainty as to what subset of all sales transactions (“done deals”)
trigger Revlon. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 11; Manesh, supra note 12;
Laster, supra note 14. We ask, rather, whether certain attempted but failed
(“no-deal”) change of control or break-up transactions also trigger Revlon in a
way that has remedial significance, and examine what that tells us about the
larger state of the Revlon doctrine today.
17. Infra Part III.
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board properly halt a sales process in an effort to avoid a
suboptimal transaction likely to expose directors to stricter
Revlon review if, at the same time, doing so imperils (or
enhances) the future of the company? Should the director focus in
this setting still narrowly be the Revlon-mandated immediate
shareholder value purpose or should it expand to include the
overall financial well-being of the company itself? If, by contrast,
directors continue the sales effort, but do so poorly—such that no
transaction results—can their own faulty performance serve,
oddly, to spare them Revlon review, simply because they did no
deal? Third, the lack of clear judicial guidance as to director
exposure in “no-deal” cases creates uncertainty in settlement
negotiations after a failed sales process results in a dramatic drop
in stock price or even corporate insolvency.18 This question is
particularly important in bankruptcy proceedings where trustees
frequently pursue fiduciary duty claims against directors to
collect directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance proceeds, a
key asset19—perhaps the only significant asset—in that setting.
Finally, and most importantly, this legal issue and the
strategic and behavioral issues associated with it—in both the
deal-making and litigation contexts—helps to illuminate how
contemporary Revlon review fits into Delaware’s evolving
18. For example, Clearwire Corp., which recently announced and
completed a merger with Sprint Nextel Corp., had earlier announced that it
could not survive alone. Liz Hoffman, Quinn Predicts Dangers in ClearwireSprint Trial, LAW 360 1–2 (last updated May 10, 2013), http://www.law360.
com/articles/439583/print?section=securities (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). BlackBerry also likely faces a hard
road remaining independent, and announced in August 2013 that it was for
sale. Will Connors & Sharon Terlep, BlackBerry Posts For-Sale Sign, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 13, 2013, at B1. After months of talks with potential buyers, and with
the one formal offer for the company falling through, the company announced
that it had abandoned the sales process and instead would issue $1 billion of
convertible notes to investors led by BlackBerry’s largest shareholder, Fairfax
Financial Holdings, which was also the entity that had made the offer for the
company. Euan Rocha & Allison Martell, BlackBerry Calls Off Sale, Spurring
Doubts and Stock Plunge, REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/us-blackberry-offer-idUSBRE9A30GI20131104
(last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. We know of no empirical study gathering all of the federal bankruptcy
cases where the trustee (or similar official) pursues fiduciary duty claims
against directors and officers of insolvent companies. Professor Johnson,
however, has served as an expert witness in several such cases, and we believe
there have been a large number of such lawsuits in recent years.
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fiduciary jurisprudence. For example, because the same director
liability standard of Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan20 applies both
inside and outside of the Revlon context,21 there no longer is a
different liability standard in the Revlon sale context as opposed
to any other context; there is, rather, simply a vast array of
different factual settings for considering monetary sanctions
against directors, only one of which is the corporate sale setting.
Whether directors do or do not consummate a transaction in the
M&A context, they must not consciously disregard their fiduciary
duty and thereby breach the duty of loyalty;22 Revlon has no
distinctive bearing on that issue. Thus, oft-recited statements in
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.23 and
other high-profile Revlon progeny regarding enhanced
substantive scrutiny by courts,24 and statements regarding
placing an initial burden of proof on directors,25 appear to be
outmoded doctrinal vestiges in the personal liability context. The
overly exalted place of Revlon in the law governing M&A deals
endures, we believe, because it is regarded in narrow, silo-like
doctrinal isolation, even though it can only be understood as one
part of a larger legal landscape that has changed quite
dramatically since 1986.
Nonetheless, any effort to harmonize Revlon review with
Delaware’s overarching fiduciary duty doctrine through this
single damages standard for directors, whether in or out of the
Revlon mode, only partially succeeds. There still remains a
distinctive, if sharply reduced, thrust to Revlon in the M&A
20. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
21. See id. at 243–44 (explaining that director liability for violating the
duty of loyalty requires a conscious disregard of duty, whether inside or outside
of the Revlon context).
22. See infra Part IV (discussing the evolving standard of loyalty in
Delaware).
23. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
24. See id. at 36 (“[T]he sale of control in this case . . . implicates enhanced
judicial scrutiny of the conduct of the Paramount Board.”); see also Koehler v.
NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. CIV.A. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *11 (Del.
Ch. May 21, 2013) (applying QVC’s enhanced scrutiny under Revlon).
25. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (“The directors have the burden of proving
that they were adequately informed and acted reasonably.”); Koehler, 2013 WL
2181518, at *11 (“The directors have the burden of proving that they were fully
informed and acted reasonably.”).
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context. This is because plaintiffs also frequently seek to enjoin
proposed transactions before they close.26 Of course, in a failed
sales effort, there is no deal to enjoin. Consequently, in the M&A
setting, the Revlon doctrine currently has legal “bite” only in
preliminary injunction (but not damages) actions, and even here
its diminished role as a pre-closing, nonmonetary remedies
doctrine is limited to “done deals.” Moreover, in the “done deal”
context, Delaware courts recently have been extremely reluctant
to grant injunctive relief even where directors likely have
breached their Revlon duties.27 The Court of Chancery, as noted
in Part IV below, has granted only one such injunction since
2008.28 Still, although remedial relief in done deals subject to
Revlon has declined, there is at least some remote chance for preclosing relief, unlike the no-deal context, where poor-performing
directors face no such sanction. Although it makes no ex ante
conceptual or policy sense for directors—once they set out to sell a
company—to be held to a higher review standard if they succeed
than if they fail to enter a transaction, that is, ex post and in
practice, precisely today’s likely outcome.
By understanding Revlon as a remedies doctrine, the larger
boundary puzzle of what falls inside and outside the vaunted
Revlon doctrine—and why it matters—still remains, but the
stakes are far smaller than many scholars, judges, and lawyers
26. Along with additional disclosure, a preliminary injunction is a common
remedy sought by plaintiffs challenging M&A transactions pre-closing. See
DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that plaintiffs challenging
mergers frequently ask the court to enjoin a shareholder vote); Rendon, supra
note 4, at 4–5 (discussing suits to enjoin shareholder votes). We also note a
trend in shareholder lawsuits evolving from “seeking to block deals that have
already been announced and agreed upon to attempting to preemptively enjoin
proposed transactions before a binding agreement has been reached.” Michael
Glasser, M&A Shareholder Lawsuits Continue to be Popular, But Merits
Uncertain, BUSINESS LAW CURRENTS (Aug. 8, 2013), http://currents.westlaw
business.com/Article.aspx?id=c38cf5c7-473c-411e-bf84-5de859d85f9f&cid=&src=
&sp= (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (citing the multiple lawsuits recently filed
against Dole Food Company, Inc. upon the announcement of a proposal to
acquire the company, but before an agreement had even been negotiated, which
occurred on August 12, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also infra notes 235, 241 and accompanying text.
27. See Glasser, supra note 26 (“Even when judges have found that a
merger process was ‘tainted by disloyalty,’ they have refused to enjoin the
acquisition and allowed it to proceed to a shareholder vote.”).
28. See infra note 238 (describing the only time an injunction was granted).
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may fully appreciate: only pre-closing relief is up for grabs
anyway. Our paper thus uses the “no transaction” issue more
generally to explore and critique Revlon’s continuing, if more
modest, status as a possibly useful, but essentially
nonenforceable, norm in the M&A setting. Given its limited ex
post legal role today, Revlon’s enduring value may be simply to
provide an ex ante benchmark for directors conducting corporate
sales; assuming, critically, that continued adherence to Revlon’s
key (and disputable) normative goal of immediate value
maximization29 remains desirable in 2014.
The organization of this Article is as follows: Part II traces
the course of the Revlon doctrine and sets out what today is the
doctrinal essence of the Revlon duty. Part III is an extended
consideration of whether and why Revlon, as a matter of sound
doctrine and policy, should apply to a sales effort that fails to
produce a transaction, thereby potentially broadening and
invigorating the sweep of Revlon. Part IV explains why, however,
Revlon today has dwindled, not broadened, in utility. Ex post it is
a cabined, pre-closing remedies doctrine that, nonetheless, may
continue to play an important ex ante role in articulating a
higher-than-ordinary standard for prospectively guiding director
conduct in the high-stakes M&A setting. In light of our remedies
analysis, this Part then revisits and questions whether Revlon’s
iconic focus on immediate value-maximization should be retained.
Part V is a brief conclusion.
II. The Essence of Revlon
Given the imperatives of the rampant hostile takeover
movement of the 1980s,30 during that decade the Delaware
Supreme Court dramatically reconfigured the fiduciary duty
29. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
185 (Del. 1986) (“[T]he directors allowed considerations other than the
maximization of shareholder profit to affect their judgment, and followed a
course that ended the auction . . . to the ultimate detriment of its
shareholders.”). “No such defensive measure can be sustained when it
represents a breach of the directors' fundamental duty of care.” Id.
30. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1862–64 (1989) (discussing the increase in hostile takeover
activity).

THE DWINDLING OF REVLON

175

standards applicable to corporate directors. Landmark decisions
in the 1984–1986 period included Aronson v. Lewis,31 Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,32 Moran v. Household International,
Inc.,33 and Revlon.34 Hundreds of cases have cited Revlon in the
twenty-eight years of its existence,35 and it has spawned
extensive commentary.36 Yet, more so than any of the other
towering decisions from that era, significant uncertainty still
surrounds the so-called Revlon doctrine.37 This uncertainty
stems, in part, from a failure to more clearly identify and justify
the key underlying rationales for the Revlon doctrine,38 and from
ongoing imprecision as to the precise “contours” of the doctrine.39
To put the latter issue another way, lingering doubt remains as to

31. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807 (Del. 1984) (reviewing whether
“a stockholder’s demand upon a board of directors, to redress an alleged wrong
to the corporation, [was] excused as futile prior to the filing of a derivative
suit”).
32. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985)
(reviewing “the validity of a corporation’s self-tender for its own shares which
excludes from participation a stockholder making a hostile tender offer for the
company’s stock”).
33. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985)
(reviewing a Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan—i.e., a “poison pill”—in the
context of preparing for a corporate takeover).
34. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175–76 (reviewing director duties in a battle for
corporate control).
35. As of October 30, 2013, Westlaw’s KeyCite listed 437 cases that are
“Citing References” to Revlon.
36. For a collection of many of these commentaries, see generally
Bainbridge, supra note 11; Manesh, supra note 12; Gevurtz, supra note 13;
Laster, supra note 14.
37. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text (providing four law
review articles that address the Revlon doctrine’s uncertainty).
38. See Gevurtz, supra note 13, at 1545
Normally, courts can look to a doctrine’s underlying rationale to help
resolve the issues regarding the doctrine’s scope . . . . With Revlon,
however, the failure of the Delaware courts to resolve such issues
satisfactorily is symptomatic of the fact that there really is no sensible
underlying rationale for the doctrine.
39. See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 3314–15 (“Although the court
continued to identify a limited class of cases in which Revlon was the controlling
precedent, it also continued to confirm QVC’s holding that Revlon is properly
understood as a mere variant of Unocal rather than as a separate doctrine.”);
Manesh, supra note 12, at 5 (“In reality, the boundaries of Revlon-land are
murky.”).
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what, exactly, “triggers” the ostensibly more demanding Revlon
standard?
Professor Stephen Bainbridge, for example, recently leveled a
stinging critique of certain chancery court decisions on just this
latter basis, contending they badly misread supreme court
precedent.40 This seems to be an important question in mixed
consideration deals and it is one that has plagued Delaware
law—and commentary on it—for some time.41 We take up a very
different and far more fundamental Revlon “trigger” question,
however, one that, to our knowledge, has received no sustained
attention from courts or commentators: does Revlon require a
transaction?
To frame our examination of that novel issue and to use it as
a way to critically assess Revlon’s true status today, this Part
summarizes the history and core features of the Revlon doctrine.
Our treatment here is necessarily brief because full coverage is
not the chief aim of this Article and because other extensive
discussions of this subject already exist.42 Our summary in this
Part follows standard practice and examines Revlon as the
discrete “standalone” doctrine it is widely but wrongly considered
to be, and thus it serves to contextualize and set up our larger
argument on the unexamined questions we explore in Parts III
and IV.

40. Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 3323–31. We note that Professor Mohsen
Manesh has written that the Bainbridge critique misses the mark. Manesh,
supra note 12, at 4 (“In constructing his critique, however, Bainbridge
overstates the chancery court precedent with which he takes issue as well as the
supreme court precedent upon which he bases his conflict-of-interests thesis. In
reality, the boundaries of Revlon-land are murky.”); see also Morgan WhiteSmith, Revisiting Revlon: Should Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers Depend on the
Method of Payment?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1177, 1194–95 (2012) (approving of
recent Chancery Court decisions that reconceptualize the factors triggering
Revlon).
41. As will be seen, our argument will end up demonstrating that the
stakes in the Revlon mixed consideration debate are actually quite small.
42. See supra notes 11–14; see generally White-Smith, supra note 40, at
1178 (discussing the criteria for triggering Revlon in mixed-consideration
transactions).
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A. Revlon
Revlon was decided during the 1980s “wave of corporate
takeovers.”43 So-called corporate “raiders” routinely took spurned
acquisition proposals directly to target company stockholders by
launching tender offers that enabled them to bypass unfriendly
boards of directors.44 Many in the business and legal communities
saw hostile takeovers as a positive development, “not only
enhanc[ing] shareholder wealth in the short run” but also making
corporations more efficient.45 Therefore, a board of directors that
interfered with this process through the use of defensive
measures, or by favoring non-shareholder interests in the sale of
a company, was looked upon, in the eyes of many, with great
suspicion.46 The Delaware Supreme Court was faced with just
such a situation in the Revlon case, and the court took advantage
of the opportunity to craft a novel standard for assessing the
conduct of a board of directors in selling a company.
In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held, with little
normative justification, that once the break-up of a corporate
entity becomes inevitable, the sole duty of the board of directors
becomes “maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit.”47 The break-up of Revlon became
inevitable during the battle for control of the company between
Pantry Pride, Inc. (an entity ultimately controlled by Ronald O.
43. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185
(Del. 1986).
44. See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 3285–86 (“In a merger, two
corporations combine to form a single entity. In an asset sale, the selling
corporation transfers all or substantially all of its assets to the buyer. In both
transactions, approval by the target board of directors is an essential
precondition.” (citations omitted)). Other things being equal, approval of the
board of directors is not required when a bidder acquires shares of a target
corporation through a tender offer. Id. at 3286.
45. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 30, at 1864 (citing commentary). The
threat of an unsolicited takeover through a tender offer was seen by many as
reducing traditional corporate law agency costs deriving from the imbalance of
power between the agents—management—and the putative principal—
stockholders—forcing management to run their businesses more efficiently or
risk being seen as undervalued in the marketplace, thus becoming a target for
corporate raiders. Id.
46. See id. at 1910–12 (describing the pro-takeover outlook).
47. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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Perelman) and leveraged buyout specialist Forstmann Little &
Co.48 Faced with the threat of an unwanted hostile takeover by
Pantry Pride, the Revlon board implemented several defensive
measures, including a poison pill and the repurchase of ten
million shares of the company’s common stock in exchange for
promissory notes and preferred stock.49 The board also approved
the initiation of a search for a “white knight,” which culminated
in an agreement to be acquired by Forstmann.50 The agreement
with Forstmann included several protective provisions, including
a no-shop clause, a termination fee, and a lock-up option granting
Forstmann the right to purchase two divisions of Revlon for
significantly less than market value in the event that another
potential acquirer purchased 40% or more of Revlon’s shares.51
While the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Revlon
board’s initial defensive measures, including the poison pill,
under a Unocal analysis,52 the supreme court went in a different
direction in analyzing the board’s approval of the protective
provisions in the Forstmann agreement.53 The Delaware Supreme
Court found that after successive legitimate offers for the
48. Id. at 175, 182.
49. Id. at 177. Revlon repurchased all ten million shares in the offering,
exchanging for each share of common stock tendered, one Senior Subordinated
Note of $47.50 principal (the same price per share as the most recent Pantry
Pride offer for Revlon) at 11.75% interest, due in ten years, and one-tenth of a
share of $9.00 Cumulative Convertible Exchangeable Preferred Stock valued at
$100 per share. Id.
50. Id. at 177–78.
51. Id. at 178.
52. See id. at 180–81 (describing the Unocal precedent and its application
to the case). A “Unocal analysis” is applied when a board adopts defensive
measures due to the high potential of a conflict of interest between the board
and stockholders. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–57
(Del. 1985). The initial burden of proof is placed on the target board of directors
to prove “they had reasonable grounds for believing there was a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness, a burden satisfied by a showing of good faith
and reasonable investigation.” Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
506 A.2d. 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). In addition, the
board must show that any defenses implemented are “reasonable in relation to
the threat posed.” Id. at 180 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
53. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (“The duty of the board had thus changed
from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the
company’s value at sale . . . . The whole question of defensive measures became
moot.”).
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company by Pantry Pride and the Revlon board’s subsequent
search for a white knight, “it became apparent to all that the
break-up of the company was inevitable.”54 At that point, the
“directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company.”55 This dramatic and
narrowed shift of the directors’ objective in a corporate break-up
context is the central teaching of Revlon. Never before had
shareholder primacy been so forcefully and singularly expressed
by a Delaware court.56
Once this duty to obtain the best price for stockholders was
triggered, the Revlon board’s only permissible metric, the court
emphasized, was “the maximization of shareholder profit.”57 Yet,
in approving the protective provisions in the Forstmann
agreement, particularly the lock-up option,58 the board had
clearly considered other interests.59 The final purchase price
negotiated with Forstmann represented “very little actual
improvement” over the most recent offer by Pantry Pride.60 But
Forstmann had agreed to assume all of Revlon’s obligations
under the notes and to support the par value of the notes in the
market.61 In addition to being in the interests of the noteholders,
this support was thought to be in the interests of Revlon’s
directors personally because, following a significant decline in the
54. Id. at 177–78, 182. Pantry Pride’s initial hostile move was initiated on
August 23, 1986, and despite the defensive measures taken by the Revlon board,
Pantry Pride continued to increase its offers for the company, with a bid of $53
per share two days before the Revlon board approved a merger with Forstmann
at $56 per share. Id. at 177–78.
55. Id. at 182.
56. See Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of
Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 913–17 (1990)
(analyzing Revlon as the first case where the Delaware Supreme Court
expressed shareholder primacy).
57. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
58. Id. at 182, 185.
59. See id. at 182, 184–85 (discussing the board’s consideration of
noteholders’ interests).
60. Id. at 184. While the final price negotiated with Forstmann of $57.25
per share was “objectively higher than Pantry Pride’s $56.25 bid, the margin of
superiority is less when the Forstmann price is adjusted for the time value of
money.” Id.
61. Id. at 178–79, 182.
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market value of the notes, the noteholders were threatening
litigation.62 In approving the “auction-ending lock-up agreement”
with Forstmann, the Revlon directors had breached their primary
duties of care and loyalty by allowing “considerations other than
the maximization of shareholder profit to affect their
judgment . . . to the ultimate detriment of [the] shareholders.”63
B. Revlon’s Progeny
In the almost three decades since the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision in the Revlon case, the Delaware courts have
revisited the decision time and time again.64 The cases primarily
address persistent questions as to when exactly the Revlon mode
is triggered and, once triggered, how the board must conduct the
sales process to obtain the best price for the stockholders.65 These
lingering questions are considered to be so critical because the
Revlon doctrine articulates such a sharp focus on immediate
share value maximization once a company is in the Revlon mode.
1. When is Revlon Mode Triggered?
Two Delaware Supreme Court decisions involving
Paramount Communications, Inc. provide important guidance on
when a board has entered Revlon mode. In Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,66 the supreme court stated
that there are at least two scenarios that may implicate “Revlon
duties,” (1) “when a corporation initiates an active bidding
process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization
involving a clear break-up of the company” and (2) “where, in
response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term

62. Id. at 179, 182, 184.
63. Id. at 182, 185.
64. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting how many cases have
cited to Revlon).
65. See supra notes 11–13, 37–40 and accompanying text (noting the courts’
attempts to resolve these issues left open by Revlon).
66. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
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strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the
breakup of the company.”67
In the Time case, the supreme court declined to apply Revlon
because the stock for stock merger negotiations had not “made
the dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity inevitable.”68
As part of its long-term strategy of expanding into the
entertainment industry, the Time board had negotiated a
strategic merger with Warner Communications, Inc.69 Although
Time’s stockholders would become minority holders in the
combined entity, Time would retain control over the board of
directors and the position of chief executive officer.70 After
announcement of the merger with Warner, Paramount stepped in
with an unwelcome attempt to acquire Time.71 The Time board
67. Id. at 1150. Note that the supreme court identified a third scenario for
triggering Revlon in Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d
34, 42–43, 47 (Del. 1993); see also Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650
A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994) (noting that a Revlon duty attaches in three
scenarios, and including the situation in QVC as the third scenario). The third
scenario is “when approval of a transaction results in a ‘sale or change of
control.’” Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290 (quoting QVC, 637 A.2d at 42–43, 47). There
is no “‘sale or change in control’ when ‘[c]ontrol of both [companies] remain[s] in
a large, fluid, changeable and changing market.’” Id. (quoting QVC, 637 A.2d at
47) (emphasis omitted).
68. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
69. See id. at 1144–45 (discussing the business rationale behind Time’s
merger). The merger represented a crucial step in this strategic plan. Id. at
1144. The Time board believed that Warner was the superior partner for such a
transaction because of Warner’s “much desired production capability and an
established international marketing chain.” Id. at 1148.
70. See id. at 1144–46 (noting that a majority of Time’s board believed that
a merger of Time and Warner was only feasible if Time controlled the resulting
board, even though Warner shareholders would control 62% of the new entity).
Time’s board insisted that Time control the board of directors of the combined
entity in order to preserve the company’s strong reputation and “a management
committed to Time’s journalistic integrity.” Id. at 1144. Time’s outside directors
were concerned with maintaining the “Time Culture,” which they perceived as
being recognized “as an institution built upon a foundation of journalistic
integrity.” Id. at 1143 n.4.
71. Id. at 1147–48. Shortly after the Warner merger was announced,
Paramount made an unsolicited all-cash offer to purchase all of Time’s shares
for $175 per share, which it eventually increased to $200 per share. Id. at 1147–
49. The offers represented premiums of almost $50 and $75 per share
respectively based on Time’s $126 per share trading price the day prior to the
first Paramount offer. Id. Paramount also stated that its offers were “fullynegotiable.” Id. at 1147 (internal quotations omitted).
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rejected Paramount’s overtures as inadequate, concluding that
the Warner merger “offered a greater long-term value for the
stockholders and, unlike Paramount’s offer, did not pose a threat
to Time’s survival and its ‘culture.’”72 Time’s board considered the
merger with Warner to be a continuation of its existing business,
and, other than the rejected Paramount overtures, there was
nothing to indicate that a break-up or dissolution of Time as a
continuing and intact company was imminent.73
In an unanticipated twist following its Time decision, in
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,74 the
Delaware Supreme Court applied the share price maximization
goal of Revlon to the Paramount board’s negotiation of a stock for
stock merger with Viacom, Inc., an entity controlled by Sumner
Redstone.75 Paramount and Viacom entered into a merger
agreement that contained several defensive measures, including
a no-shop clause, a termination fee, and most significantly, a
stock option agreement giving Viacom the right to acquire
approximately 19.9% of Paramount’s stock in the event any of the
triggers for the termination fee occurred.76 Despite these
defenses, QVC launched a competing offer,77 and after stalled
72. Id. at 1149; see also id. at 1148–49 (discussing the rationale behind
Time’s rejection of Paramount’s previous offer of $175 per share). Time also
adopted several defensive measures and restructured its deal with Warner,
including adding a cash component that would require Time to assume $7 to $10
billion worth of debt, “thus eliminating one of the principal transaction-related
benefits of the original merger agreement.” Id. at 1148. Time’s motive for adding
the cash component appears to have been driven, at least in part, by the fact
that it would reduce the number of Time shares to be issued in the merger,
resulting in Time’s stockholders no longer having the right to vote on the
transaction under New York Stock Exchange Rules. Id. Time’s board cited a
concern that the stockholders, mostly institutional investors, “would not
comprehend the long-term benefits of the Warner merger” and would jump at
the immediate cash premium represented by Paramount’s all-cash offer. Id. at
1148.
73. Id. at 1149.
74. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
75. See id. at 38–39, 44 (summarizing the proposed merger and finding
Revlon mandates that a board must maximize company value in a sale of control
transaction). Redstone controlled approximately 85.2% of Viacom’s voting Class
A stock and approximately 69.2% of Viacom’s nonvoting Class B stock. Id. at 38.
76. Id. at 39.
77. Id. QVC sent a letter to Paramount proposing a merger in which QVC
would acquire Paramount for approximately $80 per share, consisting of 0.893
shares of QVC common stock and $30 in cash. Id.
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negotiations with Paramount’s board, QVC went directly to
Paramount’s stockholders with a cash tender offer for 51% of
Paramount’s shares to be followed by a stock-for-stock second
step merger.78 Although now armed with the leverage of a
competing bid, the Paramount board failed to use its new position
to negotiate a truly improved deal with Viacom.79 QVC’s rival
offer represented a higher price per share than Viacom’s offer, yet
the Paramount board rejected the QVC offer as “excessively
conditional.”80
In applying Revlon scrutiny to the Paramount board’s
conduct in negotiating the merger, the supreme court emphasized
that, prior to the proposed combination with Viacom,
Paramount’s stock was “not vested in a single person, entity, or
group, but vested in the fluid aggregation of unaffiliated
stockholders.”81 Following the merger with Viacom, however,
Paramount’s stockholders would suffer “significant diminution” of
their voting power, becoming minority stockholders in an entity
controlled by Summer Redstone.82 Thus, the court reasoned, the
Paramount–Viacom merger represented the last opportunity for
Paramount’s stockholders to collectively negotiate a control
premium for their shares.83 This post-deal outcome differed from
that in the Time case, where Time’s shareholders would still have
the opportunity to obtain a premium in a subsequent sale of the
combined company.84 Still, such a true merger of equals as seen
78. Id. at 40. The tender offer was all-cash at $80 per share. Id. On the
same day as the announcement of the tender offer, QVC brought suit seeking to
enjoin the defensive measures protecting the Paramount-Viacom merger. Id.
79. See id. at 40–41 (noting that the renegotiated merger agreement was
“essentially the same as” the original agreement). While Viacom did raise its
offer, it did not meet QVC’s final offers, and the defensive measures remained in
the amended merger agreements. Id.
80. Id. at 41. The latest Viacom bid was $85 per share in cash, which the
Paramount board approved and recommended to shareholders, yet QVC’s last
bid was $90 per share, consisting of cash and QVC stock. Id.
81. Id. at 43.
82. Id. at 42–43.
83. See id. at 43 (positing that “Paramount stockholders [were] entitled to
receive, and should receive, a control premium” for the loss of control the deal
would cause). Of course, no stockholder alone is legally or practically able to
obtain such a premium.
84. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del.
1990) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that the adoption of structural safety
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in Time is vastly different than many Silicon Valley deals today,
where a large buyer (itself lacking a controlling shareholder) uses
its stock to buy a start-up company. Although, in theory, the
start-up’s shareholders could obtain a premium on a subsequent
sale of the larger entity, realistically the time for a measurable,
company-specific premium is upon sale to the initial acquirer.
Yet, based on the Time decision, Revlon has no application to
these deals.85 Of course, if there is a controlling shareholder in
the buyer itself—as with Facebook and Google, for example—
then, just as in QVC, Revlon’s short-term value maximization
directive would apply.86 Such are the ongoing boundary issues
raised by the Revlon doctrine.
The subsequent supreme court decisions in Arnold v. Society
for Savings Bancorp, Inc.87 and In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp.
Shareholder Litigation,88 provide further guidance for
determining when a board’s actions rise to the level of “seeking to
sell control”89 or otherwise taking actions that will make “the
dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity inevitable.”90 In
Arnold, the supreme court held that a seller’s board is not
“seeking to sell itself” unless it “initiate[s] an active bidding
process.”91 Less than a year later, in Santa Fe, the supreme court
clarified that in addition to the initiation of such an active
bidding process, Revlon mode is not triggered unless the board
also “seek[s] to sell control of the company or take other actions
which would result in a break-up of the company.”92

devices “prevented shareholders from obtaining a control premium in the
immediate future and thus violated Revlon”).
85. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text (describing the holding
and factual circumstances relied upon in the Time decision, including the
absence of a controlling shareholder and timing issues).
86. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (explaining why the
supreme court relied upon the controlling shareholder status of Sumner
Redstone to apply Revlon scrutiny to the merger).
87. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
88. 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
89. Id. at 71.
90. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1990).
91. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290 (quoting Time, 571 A.2d at 1150).
92. In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 71.
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The transaction in Santa Fe involved an all-stock merger of
publicly held corporations (Santa Fe Pacific Corporation and
Burlington Northern Inc.), neither of which had controlling
stockholders.93 While the Santa Fe–Burlington merger was being
negotiated, Union Pacific Corporation made an unsolicited
proposal to acquire Santa Fe, first attempting to negotiate a deal
with the Santa Fe board, and then taking its proposal directly to
the Santa Fe stockholders.94 While the Santa Fe board
encouraged Union Pacific to increase its offers and used the
revised offers as leverage to renegotiate the terms of Santa Fe’s
merger with Burlington,95 the supreme court found that the
Santa Fe board had remained “firmly committed to a stock-forstock merger.”96 Thus, while the Santa Fe board may have
“initiated an active bidding process,” it did not seek to sell control
of the company or otherwise take actions to break up the
company, and so the Santa Fe board had not triggered its Revlon
duties.97
93. See id. at 64, 71 (describing the terms of the merger agreement and the
supreme court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s contention that post-merger control
would not remain in a “large,” “fluid,” and “changing” market). The acquirer,
Burlington, would contribute 0.4 shares of its common stock for each share of
Santa Fe stock. Id.
94. Id. at 63. After the Santa Fe board rejected two offers from the third
party bidder, Union Pacific, citing its fear that a merger with Union Pacific
would not pass regulatory muster, and after a renegotiation of the Santa Fe–
Burlington merger at a higher price, Union Pacific went directly to the Santa Fe
shareholders with a hostile offer. Id. The Santa Fe board responded by
recommending that the Santa Fe stockholders not tender their shares, by taking
certain defensive measures—including the adoption of a poison pill—and by
renegotiating the deal with Burlington. Id. at 64–65.
95. Id. at 64.
96. Id. at 71.
97. See id. at 70–71 (explaining that the duty under Revlon “to seek the
best value reasonably available” was not implicated because plaintiffs did not
allege the board sought to transfer control of the company). The supreme court
also considered whether Revlon might have been triggered due to the approval
of a transaction resulting in a “sale or change of control.” Id. at 71 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). However, the plaintiffs made no allegations
that Burlington had a controlling stockholder. See id. (noting that the complaint
lacked “a description of the stock ownership structure of Burlington”). And so
the supreme court was forced to assume that control of Burlington and Santa Fe
after the merger would “remain ‘in a large, fluid, changeable and changing
market.’” Id. (citing Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290
(Del. 1994) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d
34, 47 (Del. 1993))).
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One aspect of the Santa Fe–Burlington merger has led to
Delaware courts98 and legal commentators99 repeatedly
mischaracterizing the Santa Fe decision as holding that Revlon
mode is not triggered when a board negotiates a merger with a
mixed consideration that consists of 67% stock and 33% cash.
While as a practical matter this mix of stock and cash is generally
how the economics of the Santa Fe–Burlington merger played
out,100 the court treats the Santa Fe–Burlington deal as a
98. See In re Synthes S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1048 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(“In the case of [Santa Fe], the [Delaware] Supreme Court held that a merger
transaction involving . . . consideration of 33% cash and 67% stock did not
trigger Revlon review when there was no basis to infer that the stock portion of
that consideration was stock in a controlled company.” (citing In re Santa Fe
Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995))); see also In re Smurfit–
Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6164–VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at
*13 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (noting that in Santa Fe the supreme court did not
apply Revlon to a transaction “in which Burlington would acquire up to 33% of
Santa Fe common shares through a tender offer (i.e., cash)”); In re NYMEX
S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 3621–VCN, 3835–VCN, 2009 WL 3206051, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 30, 2009) (“In [Santa Fe], the [Delaware] Supreme Court held that a
merger transaction involving consideration of 33% cash and 67% stock did not
trigger Revlon.” (citing In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59,
70–71 (Del. 1995))); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25
(Del. Ch. 1999) (noting that Santa Fe, involving consideration of only 33% cash,
did not control the current case in which “over 60% of the consideration is
cash”).
99. See Manesh, supra note 12, at 31 (“[I]n Santa Fe, the supreme court
ruled that Revlon was inapplicable to a transaction in which the target
shareholders were to receive a 33–67 mix of cash and acquirer stock for their
shares in the target corporation.” (citing In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holders
Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995))); Gevurtz, supra note 13, at 1527 (“In Santa
Fe, the court held that Revlon did not apply to a merger with a company lacking
a controlling shareholder when 33% of the shareholders received cash in the
transaction and the rest received stock.” (citing In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp.
S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 64–65, 71 (Del. 1995))).
100. Following the hostile tender offer by Union Pacific, Santa Fe and
Burlington negotiated a second amended merger agreement. In re Santa Fe Pac.
Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 64–65 (Del. 1995). “The [Santa Fe] [b]oard
also announced a joint tender offer for up to 33% of Santa Fe’s common shares
at a cash price of $20 per share. Burlington would also purchase up to 13% and
Santa Fe would purchase up to 20% of its own stock.” Id.; see also Burlington N.
Inc., Tender Offer Statement, Amendment No. 7 (Schedule 14D-1/A) (Dec. 23,
1994) [hereinafter Press Release, Burlington N. Inc.], available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/351979/0000950103-95-000065.txt
(announcing expiration of the joint tender offer, which was oversubscribed,
resulting in Burlington and Santa Fe purchasing the full 63 million shares or
33% of Santa Fe’s outstanding stock as of the date the tender offer was
announced). After Union Pacific increased its tender offer price to $18.50 per
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standard stock-for-stock merger throughout its opinion.101 With
the cash tender offer not conditioned on the closing of the merger,
and indeed with the tender offer closing more than seven months
after the merger itself closed,102 the supreme court appears to
share, Santa Fe and Burlington again revised the terms of their merger,
including to allow Santa Fe to repurchase up to 10 million of its shares following
the joint tender offer by Santa Fe and Burlington, In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at
65, and to amend Santa Fe’s poison pill to enable another bidder, Allegheny
Corporation, to purchase up to 14.9% of Santa Fe’s shares. See id. (“Burlington
and Santa Fe also announced that the Santa Fe Rights Plan had been amended
to allow Allegheny Corporation to purchase up to 14.9% of Santa Fe shares
without triggering the Rights . . . .”). However, note that stockholders that
tendered their shares in the February 1995 joint tender offer were able to sell a
pro rata portion of their shares for cash, while stockholders that failed to tender
would receive 100% stock in the merger. See id. at 64 (explaining that first there
would be “a joint tender offer for up to 33% of Santa Fe’s common shares” and
that subsequently there would be “a merger of Santa Fe and Burlington at an
exchange ratio of 0.4 shares of Burlington stock for each Santa Fe share”
(emphases added)). Burlington and Santa Fe purchased 33% of the total
outstanding shares in the joint tender offer, but only stockholders that tendered
their shares participated in the joint tender offer. Id.
101. See id. at 71 (“[T]he complaint portrays the Board as firmly committed
to a stock-for-stock merger with Burlington.”); see also id. at 64–65 (referring to
the value of the “merger consideration” as an indicated value of $20.60 per share
based on the “exchange ratio of 0.4 shares of Burlington stock for each Santa Fe
share,” thus not considering the $20.00 per share paid by Santa Fe and
Burlington in the joint tender offer); id. at 71–72 (reviewing the joint tender
offer as a defensive measure using a Unocal analysis).
102. Although the joint tender offer by Santa Fe and Burlington was agreed
to as part of the merger agreement for the transaction, closing of the joint
tender offer and consummation of the merger were separate events. See
Burlington N., Inc. and Santa Fe Pac. Corp., Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus
(Form 424B3) 1 (Jan. 13, 1995), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/351979/0000950130-95-000083.txt (“The merger is contingent upon,
among other things, approval by the [ICC]. The merger would be consummated
shortly after ICC approval is obtained and the other conditions to the merger
are satisfied or waived. The tender offers are not conditioned on ICC approval of
the merger.”). While Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulatory
approval was a condition to the closing of the merger, it was not a condition to
the closing of the joint tender offer. Id. The joint tender offer closed in February
1995, Press Release, Burlington N. Inc., supra note 100, but ICC approval was
not obtained until July 20, 1995, In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 65, and the merger
was not consummated until September 22, 1995. See Burlington N., Inc.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 10, 1995), available at http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/934612/0000950130-95-002033.txt (“On September
22, 1995, Burlington Northern Inc. (‘BNI’) and Santa Fe Pacific Corporation
(‘SFP’) consummated a business combination (the ‘Merger’) . . . .”).
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have treated the cash tender offer as a defensive measure under
Unocal rather than as an element of the merger consideration.103
Considering the continuing lack of guidance from the
supreme court on whether the form of consideration plays a factor
in triggering Revlon mode,104 it is no surprise that courts and
commentators have extended the Santa Fe decision beyond its
actual holding.105 In addition to uncertainty as to how the form of
consideration influences whether Revlon mode is triggered,
uncertainty remains as to whether there are entry points for
triggering Revlon mode outside of the three traditional scenarios
enunciated in Arnold.106 In a recent opinion, for example,
103. In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 71–72 (finding that the plaintiffs properly
pled a Unocal claim).
104. See Manesh, supra note 12, at 31–32 (contending that the supreme
court has not clearly defined the role of consideration in triggering Revlon).
105. In the absence of direction from the Delaware Supreme Court, the
Delaware Chancery Court has used dicta to fashion its guidance on how the
form of merger consideration can affect the triggering Revlon mode. See
Manesh, supra note 12, at 4 (“Left uncertain by Delaware Supreme Court
precedent, the scope of the Revlon doctrine has been purposefully, but
cautiously, defined by the Delaware Chancery Court through the use of
dictum.”). The chancery court has consistently stated that Revlon is triggered
when a corporation is sold for cash. Id. at 14 n.52 (citing cases in which the
chancery court discusses a board’s obligations to shareholders during an all-cash
merger). The chancery court has also consistently held that absent a controlling
stockholder issue, Revlon is generally not triggered when a corporation is
acquired in a stock-for-stock merger. See, e.g., Krim v. ProNet, Inc., 744 A.2d
523, 527 (Del. Ch. 1999) (noting that the duty “to maximize shareholder value”
is not implicated in “stock-for-stock strategic mergers of publicly traded
companies”). Less clear is the court’s stance on mixed consideration
transactions; however the court has indicated that Revlon mode is triggered
when cash makes up a majority or even 50% of the mixed consideration. See In
re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating
that at least a 60% cash consideration would trigger Revlon); In re SmurfitStone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at
*13–14 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (“[T]he concern here is that there is no
“tomorrow” for approximately 50% of each stockholder’s investment in Smurfit–
Stone.”). Finally, the chancery court has generally not found Revlon mode to be
triggered where stock makes up a majority of the mixed consideration. See In re
Synthes S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1047–48 (Del. Ch. 2012) (contending that
Revlon is not triggered here because the merger involves “mixed consideration of
65% . . . stock and 35% cash,” which “does not qualify as a change of control
under [the Delaware] Supreme Court’s precedent”).
106. See infra Part III (suggesting that the three Arnold scenarios are not
the exclusive bases for invoking Revlon). The supreme court found one such a
scenario in McMullin v. Beran, in which the court held that Revlon mode was
triggered in a transaction not involving a “change of control.” 765 A.2d 910, 919–
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Chancellor Strine questioned why the plaintiffs in the case had
not argued that Revlon applies when the defendant directors set
out to sell control of the company but ultimately approve a sale
not involving a change of control.107 And, surprisingly, the
Delaware courts have not settled, and M&A litigators have not
raised, the rather basic question we take up in Part III—that is,
whether Revlon applies when a board sets out to sell control of a
company but no transaction of any kind results.
2. Once Revlon Mode Is Triggered, How Must the Board Conduct
the Sales Process?
While not changing the basic duties of care and loyalty owed
by directors as they seek immediate value maximization for
stockholders,108 Revlon mode does purportedly trigger enhanced

20 (Del. 2000). McMullin involved a deal where the company’s 80.1% controlling
stockholder negotiated the sale of the company in an all shares, cash tender
offer, followed by a cash-out merger. Id. at 915–16. Given that the minority
holders were going from a company with a controlling shareholder to a company
without a controlling shareholder, for purposes of a Revlon analysis, there was
no change of control, yet the court held that Revlon mode was triggered when
the board approved an “all shares” tender offer that was to be followed by a
second-step cash-out merger because such a decision constituted “a final-stage
transaction for all shareholders.” Id. at 918 (citing Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d
297, 306 (Del. Ch. 1994)). A few years after McMullin was decided, the
appellants in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003),
seized on the McMullin holding that Revlon may be triggered without a change
of control. Id. at 929 (noting that appellants argued that “once NCS decided to
initiate a bidding process seeking to maximize short-term stockholder value, it
cannot avoid enhanced judicial scrutiny under Revlon simply because the bidder
it selected [Genesis] happens to have proposed a merger transaction that does
not involve a change of control” (alteration in original) (internal quotations
omitted)). The supreme court sidestepped the argument by deciding the case on
other grounds. See infra note 181 and accompanying text (explaining that the
court found the standard of review was not outcome determinative and declined
to apply the heightened Revlon standard on appeal).
107. In re Synthes S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1048 n.117 (Del. Ch. 2012).
We discuss Chancellor Strine’s musings on this issue infra Part III.
108. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he basic
teaching of these precedents is simply that directors must act in accordance
with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty.” (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986))).
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judicial scrutiny of director conduct in fulfilling those duties.109 If
a plaintiff has shown that the board treated one or more bidders
on unequal terms,110 then the enhanced scrutiny test of Revlon
includes two key features: “(a) a judicial determination regarding
the adequacy of the decisionmaking process employed by the
directors, including the information on which the directors based
their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the
reasonableness of the directors’ action in light of the
circumstances then existing.”111 Significantly, moreover, unlike
ordinary business judgment rule review, the burden of proof is on
directors to show that their actions in conducting the sales
process were reasonably related to maximizing stockholder value
and were based upon adequate information.112 Heightened
judicial review for reasonableness, coupled with an initial burden
of proof being placed on directors, appears, at least when viewed
within the narrow confines of Revlon doctrine alone, to give
robust legal force to Revlon’s value-maximizing mandate.
While there is “no single blueprint” that directors of
Delaware corporations must follow in conducting a sales process
under Revlon mode,113 the Delaware courts have found that
“certain fact patterns demand certain responses.”114 Where
several bidders are competing for corporate control, the board
109. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45
(Del. 1993) (explaining that because the case involved a sale of control, “[b]oard
action in the circumstances presented here is subject to enhanced scrutiny”).
110. See id. (“The Macmillan decision articulates a specific two-part test for
analyzing board action where competing bidders are not treated equally . . . .”
(citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del.
1989))).
111. Id.
112. See id. (“The directors have the burden of proving that they were
adequately informed and acted reasonably.”); see also Koehler v. NetSpend
Holdings, Inc., Civil Action No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *11 (Del. Ch.
May 21, 2013) (describing enhanced Revlon scrutiny (citing In re Plains
Exploration & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL
1909124, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013))).
113. See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286–87 (finding that “the advice of . . .
investment bankers, when coupled with the special circumstances surrounding
the negotiation and consummation of the [management-led buyout], supported a
finding that Amsted’s directors had acted in good faith to arrange the best
possible transaction for shareholders”).
114. Id. at 1286.
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must conduct a fair auction process,115 acting in a neutral and
evenhanded manner to encourage the highest price.116 Where the
board is considering a single offer and has no reliable grounds
upon which to judge its adequacy, the board must canvas the
market for competing bids.117 It has also become a given that the
selling company directors will obtain a fairness opinion from an
investment bank to provide comfort that they have obtained a
fair price.118 A board that fails to follow these processes, as by
dealing with a single bidder, must show that it possessed
“impeccable knowledge of the company’s business for the Court to
determine that it acted reasonably.”119
Notwithstanding supposed enhanced judicial scrutiny and an
initial director burden of proof under stand-alone Revlon doctrine,
115. Id. at 1286 (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 182–85 (Del. 1986)).
116. Id. at 1286–87.
117. Id. at 1287 (citing In re Fort Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No.
9991, 1988 WL 83147 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988)). Such a market check can take
place either before a merger or acquisition agreement is entered into or
afterwards if the agreement contains a “go-shop” provision. See, e.g., In re
Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 2001) (finding that “[a]though
the board negotiated with a single bidder, it bargained hard and made sure that
the transaction was subject to a post-agreement market check unobstructed by
onerous deal protection measures that would impede a topping bid”). But see
infra note 119 (discussing a recent case, like others, where neither a pre- nor a
post-signing market check were done yet the deal was not enjoined).
118. See, e.g., In re Openlane, Inc., C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662,
at *5–6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011) (considering a fairness opinion as one factor
indicative of the board securing the “best value reasonably attainable”).
Fairness opinions are particularly important in the absence of a broad marketcheck. Id. at *7. While fairness opinions are expensive, even small companies
generally obtain them unless the company is “managed by a board with an
impeccable knowledge of the company’s business.” Id. at *5. The court may also
consider the company’s size in determining what is reasonable and appropriate.
Id. at *7.
119. Id. at *5 (citing Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc. 567 A.2d 1279, 1287
(Del. 1989)). Recently, the chancery court refused to enjoin a sale that involved
neither a pre-agreement market check nor a post-agreement “go shop” provision,
because the independent directors had extensive industry experience and made
an informed decision. In re Plains Exploration & Prod. Co., Stockholder Litig,,
C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013). Shortly
after that decision, the chancery court again expressly endorsed the
permissibility of single-bidder sales processes, under conditions of adequate
director informedness. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., Civil Action No.
8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).
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obtaining remedial relief because a board allegedly acted
unreasonably in constructing a sales process to maximize
stockholder value may be much more of a hurdle than typically
imagined. In Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan,120 the supreme court
upheld a board’s process where the merger was “negotiated and
finalized in less than one week,”121 the directors failed to press
the buyer for a better price, no market check was conducted, and
significant deal protections were in the merger agreement.122
While acknowledging that such failures could arguably raise an
issue in evaluating director conduct under a duty of care claim,
the Delaware Supreme Court cited the fact that Lyondell’s
charter contained an exculpatory provision pursuant to Delaware
General Corporation Law section 102(b)(7),123 which barred
claims for monetary damages against the directors for duty of
care breaches.124 Obtaining monetary liability from directors for
breaches of the supposedly heightened Revlon duties therefore
requires a duty of loyalty breach, by showing, for example, that a
majority of the board of directors had a conflict of interest or
otherwise acted in bad faith during the sales process.125 Yet
Revlon scrutiny as such is not necessary for such a showing.126
Thus, it begins to emerge that heightened judicial scrutiny and
the director burden of proof under Revlon may remain relevant
120. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
121. Id. at 241.
122. Id. at 238–39.
123. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013).
124. Lyondell Chemical Co., 970 A.2d at 239. The significance of the
Lyondell case on Revlon jurisprudence is explored further in Part IV, infra.
125. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083–85 (Del. 2001)
(analyzing whether a conflicted board member during the sale of a company
constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty).
126. See In re Novell, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6032-VCN, 2013 WL
322560, at *6–18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (denying, with almost no analysis of the
plaintiffs’ Revlon claim, the defendant directors’ motion to dismiss where the
plaintiffs stated a reasonably conceivable bad faith claim based on the board’s
“unexplained, extremely favorable treatment” of the successful bidder during
the acquisition process). The plaintiff in the one case did not make a Revlon
claim in a suit alleging the directors breached their duty of loyalty in approving
a sale of the company. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., Civil Action No. 1512CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). Instead, the case went
to trial under an entire fairness standard, due to a conflicted board of directors,
and at trial the defendants proved that the merger was entirely fair. In re
Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 55–79 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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only in the preliminary injunction setting, where the court is
asked to enjoin a proposed deal due to a flawed sales process, and
even here, as noted above, injunctions are extraordinarily hard to
come by. We elaborate on this in Parts III and IV as we situate
the overly insular Revlon doctrine in the larger, much-evolved
body of Delaware’s modern fiduciary duty jurisprudence.
C. A Summary of Revlon’s Essence
The supreme court’s pioneering decision in Revlon doctrinally
articulated a sharpened and narrowed corporate objective for
boards of directors. Once the break-up of a Delaware corporation
becomes inevitable, Revlon mode is triggered,127 and the board’s
objective shifts from operating the business for success over the
long run to maximizing stockholder value in the short-term.128
The subsequent decisions in the Time and QVC cases provided
important guidance on when the Revlon duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short-term is and is not triggered. In
Time, the supreme court clarified that absent the imminent
dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity, Revlon does not
apply and courts will defer to good faith and disinterested
business decisions of boards of directors, such as the decision to
enter into a stock-for-stock strategic merger.129
While the Time case appeared to narrow the application of
Revlon and thus reassert the broad power of the board of
directors to focus on the long run, stockholders regained
immediate value-maximization ground with the supreme court’s
decision in QVC. In QVC, the supreme court applied enhanced
scrutiny to determine whether a board’s sales process was
properly conducted to maximize short-term stockholder value
127. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51
(Del. 1989) (“[I]n Revlon, when the board responded to Pantry Pride’s offer by
contemplating a ‘bust-up’ sale of assets in a leveraged acquisition, we imposed
upon the board a duty to maximize immediate shareholder value and an
obligation to auction the company fairly.”).
128. See id. at 1150 n.13 (“‘[T]he duty of the board [has] changed from the
preservation of . . . [the] corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s
value at a sale for the stockholder’s benefit . . . .” (quoting Revlon v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986))).
129. Id. at 1150–51.
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where a stock-for-stock merger resulted in target company
stockholders no longer holding shares in a company owned “in a
large, fluid, changeable and changing market,” but instead
holding shares in an entity controlled by a single stockholder.130
Thus, the court observed, the board needed to obtain the best
immediate price for stockholders because the transaction
represented the last opportunity for those stockholders to earn a
control premium for their shares.131
Once Revlon mode is triggered, the burden of proof shifts
from the plaintiffs to the directors, requiring the directors to
show that they were “adequately informed and acted
reasonably.”132 This heightened scrutiny of a board’s actions
represents “a ‘middle ground’ between deference to the board
under the business judgment rule and skepticism toward the
board under entire fairness review.”133 The board must show that,
in light of available information, its sales process is reasonably
related to maximizing stockholder profit.134 Notwithstanding
these seemingly onerous intra-doctrinal demands, we must ask
whether, in light of broader legal developments, directors are
likely to bear such burdens in reality, either in damages
actions,135 or even in preliminary injunction lawsuits where the
initial burden of proof is placed on the plaintiff.136 To fully
130. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del.
1993).
131. Id. at 43.
132. Id. at 45.
133. Koehler v. Netspend Holdings, Inc., Civil Action No. 8373-VCG, 2013
WL 2181518, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).
134. See id. at *11 (“Reasonableness requires that the board be informed
and that it construct a sales process to maximize value in light of that
information.”). The Koehler court stated, “Revlon requires the Court to look to
the directors’ true intentions to determine if the directors have been motivated
by the appropriate desires: i.e., to achieve the highest price reasonably available
to the stockholders.” Id.
135. See infra Part IV.A.1.
136. Koehler, 2013 WL 2181518, at *11 n.164. To show a likelihood of
success on a preliminary injunction motion in a Revlon claim, “the Plaintiffs
bear the burden of establishing a reasonable probability that at trial the
Director Defendants would be unable to show that they acted reasonably.” In re
Plains Exploration & Prod. Co., C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124, at *4
(Del. Ch. May 9, 2013). We think, after Lyondell, that the plaintiffs’ showing
should be phrased as a reasonable probability that plaintiffs will be able to show
that one or more defendants breached their duty of loyalty. The plaintiff must

THE DWINDLING OF REVLON

195

appreciate the remarkable dwindling of Revlon, once we step
outside the cramped confines of the Revlon doctrine itself, we first
explore, in Part III, how fidelity to its core teachings should, as a
theoretical matter, actually broaden its reach into the no-deal
context.
III. Revlon in the No-Deal Context
Having delineated the Revlon doctrine in isolation and as it
has evolved (and still is evolving) over time,137 we now turn to our
central concern. Specifically, we seek to understand what
enduring significance Revlon has for corporate law jurisprudence.
To do this, we must examine Revlon from different and varied
vantage points. In this Part, we explore whether the no-deal
context holds promise for broadening and re-invigorating
Revlon.138 Ironically, it appears that the no-deal prism serves only
to magnify the diminished relevance of Revlon in today’s M&A
law.
The most complete statement of which scenarios trigger the
well-known Revlon duty of “acting reasonably to seek the
transaction offering the best value reasonably available” appears
in a 1994 Delaware Supreme Court decision.139 The court stated
that such a duty arises
in at least the following three scenarios: (1) “when a
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell
itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear
breakup of the company,” Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., Del. Supr., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (1990) . . . ;
(2) “where, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons
its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction
also show irreparable harm absent an injunction and that the balance of
hardships favors the plaintiff’s claims. Koehler, 2013 WL 2181518, at *9.
137. See supra Part II (summarizing Revlon’s “essence” and its progeny).
138. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (introducing the no-deal
context and the surrounding queries).
139. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del.
1994); see also In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 70–71 (Del.
1995) (noting that the plaintiffs “failed to state a claim that the Board had a
duty to ‘seek the transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders’” (citing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d
34, 43 (Del. 1994))).
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involving the break-up of the company,” id.; or (3) when
approval of a transaction results in a “sale or change of
control,” QVC, 637 A.2d at 42-43, 47. In the latter situation,
there is no “sale or change in control” when “‘[c]ontrol of both
[companies] remain[s] in a large, fluid, changeable and
changing market.’” Id. at 47 (citation and emphasis
omitted).140

There are several striking features of this fertile paragraph.
First, the three identified scenarios are described as nonexclusive.141 The court states, after all, that the Revlon duty
arises in “at least” the three scenarios.142 Second, the three
specified scenarios are described in the disjunctive, as in “(1) . . .
or (2) . . . or (3).”143 Third, although scenario three keys off of the
“approval of a transaction,” the first two scenarios do not.144
Rather, scenario one is triggered upon a company’s initiation of
“an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect.”145 The
clear focus is on the “process” and the “seeking” of a sale or to
“effect” a break-up.146 Similarly, scenario two is triggered short of
actually approving a deal, as it begins when the company
“abandons its long-term strategy” and “seeks an alternative
transaction.”147 Put another way, scenarios one and two seek to
regulate attempts toward an action, while scenario three keys off
of a completed act.
The clear alternative phrasing of scenarios one and two—not
centered, as is the third scenario, on the “approval of a
transaction”148—prompts our question: why is it widely presupposed that Revlon requires a transaction? It is evident that
Delaware’s courts consider the Revlon standard to be applicable
long before a deal is actually approved by directors. For example,
in the QVC decision, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that
Revlon duties were implicated in that case due to the fact that the
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290.
See id. (“[I]n at least the following three scenarios . . . .”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Paramount board, albeit unintentionally, had brought itself
“within the first general scenario” because it had “‘initiate[d] an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself.’”149 The QVC decision
quotes the 1990 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Time, in
which the Delaware Supreme Court stated that, of the several
circumstances that may implicate Revlon duties, the “first, and
clearer one, is when a corporation initiates an active bidding
process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization
involving a clear break-up of the company.”150
There are many such references in Delaware decisional law.
For example, in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, the supreme
court stated that the time for action under Revlon was when the
directors “began negotiating the sale of Lyondell.”151 And in 2012,
the chancery court noted that “[o]nce a board has decided to
undertake a sales process it is required to seek the highest value
reasonably available for the shareholders.”152 Yet it might be
objected that every reported case has, in fact, involved an actual
transaction and, therefore, Revlon mode—as elaborated in
Arnold153—implicitly presupposes a transaction. Consequently,
the reasoning would run, the three Arnold scenarios simply
describe which particular types of M&A transactions are covered
(for example, a break-up of the company or a sale of corporate
control) and when, within these transactions, the heightened
Revlon duty begins (for example, upon initiating an “active
bidding process”).154
We reject that response as faulty and lacking in support.
First, the Arnold language itself refutes that interpretation. As
noted,155 the (nonexclusive) three scenarios key off of markedly
149. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del.
1994).
150. Id. (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1150 (Del 1989)) (quotations omitted).
151. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009).
152. In re Answers Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6170–VCN, 2012 WL 1253072,
at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2012).
153. Supra notes 139–47 and accompanying text.
154. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc. 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del.
1994) (delineating the three Arnold scenarios for when a Revlon duty is
triggered).
155. Supra notes 139–47 and accompanying text.
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different actions. Second, the supreme court has described the
Revlon duty itself as a duty “to seek the transaction . . . [best for
stockholders].”156 The clear emphasis is on the selling process. To
be sure, in Santa Fe, the court observed that under the first
scenario—initiating an active bidding process—directors must be
seeking to sell control or break-up the company.157 But, assuming
that form of deal is being sought, the court clearly regarded the
first “initiating” scenario as a distinct “method of invoking the
duty” in relation to the third “approval” scenario.158 Third, given
the emphasis on the sales process, it makes no policy sense to
have different standards for directors—once they undoubtedly are
within one of the first two Arnold scenarios159—be based on
whether they did or did not succeed in pulling off a transaction. If
that were the case, directors who consummate a transaction—
whether by means of an admirable or abject effort—must face
heightened scrutiny,160 while directors who fail to cut a deal—
possibly through their own abysmal performance—would face a
more deferential, business judgment rule standard of review.161
Finally, consistent with our analysis, while there are no clear
holdings on the issue, there is considerable indication that the
“no-deal” setting should and will trigger heightened Revlon
scrutiny. In August 2012, Chancellor Strine authored suggestive

156. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290 (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994)).
157. See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del.
1995) (stating that the Revlon duty arises “when a corporation initiates an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization
involving a clear break-up of the company” (quoting Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290
(internal quotations and citation omitted))).
158. Id.
159. Supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
160. See Koehler v. Netspend Holdings, Inc., No. 8373–VCG, 2013 WL
2181518, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (recognizing that “Revlon changes the
level of scrutiny” to enhanced scrutiny for “change-of-control transactions”);
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994)
(stating that enhanced scrutiny applies to directors in order “to ensure that the
directors have acted reasonably”).
161. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152
(Del. 1989) (“[T]he refusal to entertain an offer may comport with a valid
exercise of a board’s business judgment”); TW Servs. Inc. v. SWT Acquisition
Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (same).
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language touching on Revlon in a no-deal context.162 Rejecting
the plaintiffs Revlon claim in the case before him because selling
company shareholders received a mix of 65% stock and 35% cash
from the buyer, and moved from owning stock in a company
with a controlling shareholder to one without,163 the Chancellor,
in dictum, reflected on a Revlon-related argument not raised by
plaintiff.164 Strine thought it “can be viewed as odd that a board
should be relieved of its duties under Revlon in a situation when
it has made the strategic decision to sell the company but selects
as the highest bid a stock deal that is not technically a change of
control.”165 In other words, if a board sets out to sell control but
ultimately approves a sale not involving a change of control,
Strine wondered why Revlon duties should not apply. By
analogy, we ask the closely related question of whether a board
initiating an active process seeking to sell control that
ultimately fails to approve any sale at all—and so, obviously,
likewise fails to effectuate a sale of control—should similarly
have its conduct reviewed under Revlon. In this way, if the
value-maximizing objective of Revlon, along with its enhanced
scrutiny and burden shift, truly are salutary requirements, they
would apply to all covered sales processes, whether or not
successful.
Strine allows as having “logical force” an argument that
questions whether a selling company board, having once
triggered a Revlon duty, can deactivate that duty by doing a
non-control deal.166 We ask, relatedly, whether, once tripped, the
heightened Revlon duty can be exited by electing not to (or
simply failing to) do any deal. Strine goes on to observe that a
plaintiff pressing such an unresolved Revlon issue would have to
address two supreme court decisions.167 These decisions are the
162. See In re Synthes S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1024 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(considering the role of Revlon when a board makes a decision to sell but
ultimately selects a deal that is not a change of control).
163. Id. at 1047–48.
164. See id. at 1048 n.117 (stating that the plaintiffs could have argued that
“the Board’s initial consideration of a range of strategic options . . . compels a
different result” under Revlon).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id. (“In any event, the plaintiffs do not press this point, and if they
did, they would have to address, which they did not, [two] Supreme Court[]
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Arnold case, noted above, and Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
Healthcare, Inc.168
We do not see the Arnold and Omnicare decisions as giving
pause on this unsettled Revlon issue, as Chancellor Strine hinted
without elaboration.169 First, as to Arnold, that case, of course, is
the one that first set forth the three nonexclusive scenarios for
triggering Revlon.170 Arnold did not simplistically involve,
however, as the Chancellor states, a case where Revlon did not
apply to “a board [that] was looking to sell for the highest
value.”171 Rather, although the supreme court in Arnold
acknowledged that the company was “seeking to sell itself,”172 it
went on to hold Revlon inapplicable because the board did not
ever “initiate[ ] an active bidding process.”173 Moreover, there was
no sale of control in Arnold.174 Thus, neither the first Revlon-duty
scenario nor the third Revlon-duty scenario under Arnold was
involved.175 In short, Revlon was never triggered.
Second, as to Omnicare, in that case the chancery court held
that the third Arnold scenario had not been triggered because the
approved deal was a stock-for-stock merger involving no change
of control.176 As to the first Arnold scenario, the chancery court
acknowledged that it too, as a conceptual matter, separately

decision[s] . . . .”).
168. Id. See generally Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270
(Del. 1994); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
169. See In re Synthes S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1048 n.117 (suggesting
that Revlon may not apply where the board “selects as the highest bid a stock
deal that is technically not a change of control”).
170. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1289–90.
171. In re Synthes, 50 A.3d at 1048 n.117.
172. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1289.
173. Id. at 1290 (quotation and citation omitted).
174. Id. at 1289.
175. See id. at 1290 (stating that the first Revlon-duty scenario was not
implicated because “to fall within that category, the target must have ‘initiate[d]
an active bidding process,’” and the third Revlon-duty scenario was not
implicated because the merger did not involve a change in control (quoting
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989))).
176. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 929 (Del.
2003) (describing the chancery court’s conclusion that “because the stock-forstock merger . . . did not result in a change of control, the . . . directors’ duties
under Revlon were not triggered”).
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triggered Revlon duties.177 But the court held that the selling
company, as in Arnold, did not initiate an active bidding process
and, moreover, after entering an exclusivity agreement with the
favored buyer, “abandoned” its efforts to sell the company.178 The
court then examined the selling company board’s conduct under
both ordinary business judgment rule review and the more
exacting Revlon standard, holding that both standards had been
met.179
On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the lower court’s findings
that an active bidding process had not been initiated and that the
sales process had been abandoned.180 Thus, the applicability of
Revlon where a value-maximizing, enhanced scrutiny scenario is
triggered but then exited was squarely raised. The supreme court
sidestepped resolution of this issue, however, by concluding that
the standard of review was not outcome determinative on the
facts before it and, therefore, the court went on to simply assume
arguendo that the ordinary business judgment rule standard
would be applied.181
Taken together, Arnold and Omnicare simply do not resolve
the situations posed by either Chancellor Strine or us—that is,
whether the heightened duties and director burdens associated
with Revlon, having once been triggered, can be deactivated
either by doing a sale not involving a change of control or by not
doing any sale at all. Today, these intriguing, novel, and
important questions concerning the scope of Revlon remain
unanswered under Delaware law.
Further bolstering our position on the “no-deal” issue is the
supreme court’s decision in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, where
the court underscored that the Revlon duty was activated once a
selling company board “had decided to sell” or “when a company
embarks on a transaction” or “began negotiating the sale of [the
company].”182 And Revlon itself held that the duty to maximize
177. See id. (recognizing that Revlon is triggered after an active bidding
process is initiated).
178. See id. (describing the Delaware Court of Chancery’s conclusion that
Revlon was not triggered).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 241–42 (Del. 2009). The
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the sales price began when the directors acknowledged that a
break-up was “inevitable.”183 Chancery court cases are in accord
in holding that undertaking a sales process triggers Revlon.184
Thus, it is clearly recognized that the Revlon duty arises—as it
must to accomplish its intended value-maximization purpose—
well before a particular transaction is agreed.
This is not to say—and this is not our position—that simply
“deciding” or “embarking” on a sales process of any kind is
sufficient to trigger Revlon. As Arnold itself teaches, it is not
enough to seek to sell; there must be the initiation of “an active
bidding process seeking to sell itself.”185 In addition, as clarified
by the supreme court in Santa Fe, this strand of Revlon “requires
that the Board also seek to sell control of the company or take
other actions which would result in a break-up of the
company.”186 Thus, where a board sets out to conduct an “active
bidding process seeking to sell itself” in a non-change of control
transaction, Revlon generally will not be triggered.187 This, of
court stated that the trial court was mistaken when it imposed Revlon duties on
the directors “before they either had decided to sell, or before the sale had
become inevitable.” Id. at 241. The court then stated that the Revlon duty
“applies only when a company embarks on a transaction . . . that will result in a
change of control.” Id. at 242. Finally, the court stated that “[t]he time for action
under Revlon did not begin until . . . the directors began negotiating the sale of
Lyondell.” Id.
183. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182–84 (Del. 1986) (stating that the board’s duty changed from preserving the
company to “getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company”
once the company’s break-up became inevitable).
184. See, e.g., In re Answers Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6170–VCN, 2012
WL 1253072, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2012) (“Once a board has decided to
undertake a sales process it is required to seek the highest value reasonably
available for the shareholders regardless of where that value comes from.”); see
also In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 115 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating
that Revlon applies when a board decides to sell the company); In re Delphi Fin.
Grp. S’holder Litig, C.A. No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232, at *13 (Del. Ch. Mar.
6, 2012) (stating that the directors “assumed a duty under the Revlon doctrine”
when they decided to sell the company for cash).
185. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994).
186. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995).
187. This, of course, was the situation in the well-known Time case.
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142, 1151 (Del. 1989)
(“[W]e decline to extend Revlon’s application to corporate transactions simply
because they might be construed as putting a corporation either ‘in play’ or ‘up
for sale.’”). One exception to this is where a company is sold that had a
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course, comports with the teachings of the Time case that if
control is not sold in a transaction, then the third Arnold scenario
is not triggered.188 Likewise then, under the first Arnold scenario,
Revlon is triggered by the initiation of an active bidding process
seeking to sell a company, but only if a sale of control or break-up
transaction is pursued.189
Conversely, if a sale of control or break-up transaction is
sought through the initiation of an active selling process, it does
not follow—and this is our position—that Revlon requires the
eventual approval of a change of control transaction (i.e., a “done
deal”). Were that the case, the first Arnold scenario would be a
surplusage because the third scenario adequately covers that
situation.190
Thus, to give meaning to all three Revlon scenarios
articulated in Arnold, the Revlon duty should not be construed as
requiring an actual sale of control or break-up transaction, only
its determined seeking. This, we believe, is the argument that
Chancellor Strine briefly characterized as having “logical
force.”191 To hold otherwise would mean that a corporate board of
directors, having avowedly undertaken a sales process seeking to
sell the entire company or control of it—or enter a break-up
transaction—bears no responsibility if it conducted the process so
poorly that no transaction results, to the harm of the company
itself and its shareholders. That would be an unwarranted and
conceptually bizarre outcome.
controlling shareholder before the sale. This is not a “change of control,” but a
Revlon-like duty nonetheless is implicated. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910,
919–20 (Del. 2000); see also supra note 106 (discussing McMullin).
188. See Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290 (providing that the third scenario that
triggers Revlon is “when approval of a transaction results in a ‘sale or change of
control’”). Thus, if control is not sold in a transaction, this scenario will not be
implicated. Id.
189. Santa Fe so ruled. See In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 71 (stating that the
Revlon duty arises “when a corporation initiates an active bidding process
seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear
break-up of the company” (quoting Time, 571 A.2d at 1150)).
190. See supra notes 139–40 (providing the first Arnold scenario that
triggers Revlon).
191. See In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1048 n.117 (Del.
Ch. 2012) (stating that the assertion, “that the Board’s initial consideration of a
range of strategic options . . . compels a different result,” has more “logical force”
than the plaintiff’s argument).
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The Delaware Supreme Court, moreover, has made it clear
that even nontransactional behavior can be reviewed under the
most demanding review standard of all—entire fairness.192 Thus,
directors who choose not to enter a possible transaction due to a
conflict of interest can be made to prove that their conduct was
fair.193 Similarly then, directors who clearly initiate a sale process
seeking to sell control or effectuate a break-up should, if they fail
to discharge their duties properly with the result that no deal is
done, be held to have breached their Revlon duty. The lack of a
completed transaction should not per se be an impediment to
such a claim.
We recognize that there will be, broadly, two different “nodeal” settings. One will involve a board that continues a sales
process but ultimately fails to effectuate a transaction. The
company may then continue to exist and operate or fail and enter
bankruptcy. As a matter of doctrine and policy, if the Revlon
doctrine is to continue to have vitality, it should apply to this
situation.194 The second setting involves a board, having entered
Revlon mode, deciding to halt the sales process and exit Revlon
mode. Here, fidelity to Revlon’s teachings suggests that while
such a decision should be possible, directors, if challenged, might
be required to support their decision by meeting the same valuemaximizing and enhanced scrutiny standards of Revlon. This
would impose the same standard on a decision to exit Revlon as
on a decision made while in that mode, an outcome we reject.
In sum, as to whether the no-deal setting triggers Revlon, we
conclude that while various cases have touched on the question,
we still lack authoritative guidance on this fundamental,
doctrine-defining issue. From a policy standpoint, if Revlon is to
have force, we discern no a priori rationale for reviewing director
192. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 n.33 (Del. 2009) (applying
the “entire fairness standard in a non-transaction context”).
193. See id. (stating that directors are not immune from being compelled to
demonstrate fairness simply because no sale transaction was approved).
194. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48–
49 (Del. 1993) (stating that when directors are in Revlon mode they must
consider whether a particular sale transaction or “an alternative course of
action” best maximizes value); In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 44
(Del. Ch. 2013) (stating that the best value reasonably available “may be no
transaction at all”); see also Laster, supra note 14, at 43 (stating that the best
course for stockholders could well be no transaction at all).
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behavior differently, once directors set out to sell the company,
based on whether or not a transaction was approved by the board.
What does this novel conclusion tell us about the larger state of
the Revlon doctrine in 2014? Is the potential reach of the Revlon
duty even broader than imagined? Are the potentially large
numbers of no-deal sales efforts subject to the far stricter Revlon
review than judges, lawyers (especially, plaintiffs’ lawyers), and
scholars have appreciated? While we have, in this Part,
seemingly “opened up” and extended the scope of Revlon, the next
Part goes on to use the no-deal context, a novel remedies
perspective, and overarching fiduciary duty developments since
Revlon to argue to the contrary: that Revlon in fact has
dramatically dwindled in importance all across the board.
IV. Revlon Today
A. Revlon Fades into Another, Later Doctrine
1. Revlon in Historical Perspective
As with any long-established legal doctrine, appreciating
Revlon’s original historical milieu—and subsequent changes in
it—can usefully inform contemporary understandings of the
doctrine. Revlon was orally decided by the Delaware Supreme
Court on October 31, 1985 and the court’s written opinion was
issued on March 13, 1986.195 As of both dates, Delaware had yet
to adopt the director exculpation statute, Section 102(b)(7).196
That provision, permitting a corporation’s certificate of
incorporation to absolve directors of monetary liability for
breaching the duty of care,197 became effective on July 1, 1986.198
Thus, at the time of the Revlon ruling and opinion, directors were

195. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173
(Del. 1986).
196. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012) (providing that the certificate
of incorporation may contain “[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of [the] fiduciary duty [of care] as a director”).
197. Id.
198. 65 Del. Laws, c. 289 (1986).
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fully exposed to monetary liability for duty of care breaches.199
That is significant because the Revlon value-maximization
objective was predicated on both the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty.200 Therefore, as to available remedies for directors failing
to maximize the sales price, Revlon, at the time, fully
contemplated potentially far-reaching damages.
The liability exposure of directors for breaching their Revlon
duty quickly diminished, however, as exculpation provisions
spread like wildfire throughout corporate America.201 Soon, and
continuing today, director exposure to monetary liability for care
breaches has become quite rare.202 Moreover, the standard of care
today is fairly lax, being gross negligence,203 which has been
construed as essentially a recklessness standard.204 Thus, while
corporate officers remain personally liable for duty of care
breaches,205 directors generally face only injunctive and other
equitable remedies for such breaches. And as Vice-Chancellor
199. Id.
200. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180.
201. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 751–52 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (noting that the Delaware General Assembly created a provision, for
inclusion in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation, to exculpate directors
from personal liability for breaches of duty of care, and a majority of Delaware
corporations took advantage of this provision).
202. See id. at 750 (“Because duty of care violations are actionable only if the
directors acted with gross negligence, and because in most instances money
damages are unavailable to a plaintiff who could theoretically prove a duty of
care violation, duty of care violations are rarely found.”).
203. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (confirming
that the applicable standard of care is that of gross negligence). The Van
Gorkom case, a rare case imposing personal monetary liability on directors for
breaching the duty of care, was decided just a few months before Revlon. See id.
at 893 (finding “that the director defendants breached their fiduciary duty of
care” and ordering an award of damages to be entered on remand based on the
court’s valuation of the plaintiff class’s shares).
204. See McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(“Delaware’s current understanding of gross negligence is conduct that
constitutes reckless indifference or actions that are without the bounds of
reason.”).
205. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009) (noting that
“although legislatively possible, there currently is no statutory provision
authorizing comparable exculpation of corporate officers”); see generally Lyman
Johnson & Rob Ricca, Reality Check on Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 75, 85–86
(2011) (noting that corporate officers may not be exculpated from liability for
breaching the duty of care).
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Glassock recently noted in Koehler v. Netspend Holdings Inc.,206
even a duty of care breach showing irreparable harm—due to the
unavailability of damages because of exculpation—may not be
sufficient to warrant the remedy of a preliminary injunction.207 Of
course, liability for breaching the duty of loyalty has remained
throughout. But as noted below,208 the liability standard for
breaching the duty of loyalty has itself substantially evolved (and
stiffened) in Delaware since Revlon.
2. Revlon and the Altered Arc of the Loyalty Doctrine
Quite apart from the ongoing developments within the
insular ambit of the Revlon doctrine itself, as traced in Part II,
the contours of Delaware’s overarching loyalty doctrine have been
dramatically redrawn in recent years. In 2003, then Chancellor
William Chandler denied a motion to dismiss in the high-profile
Disney litigation, ruling that the complaint, which alleged that
directors had breached their duty of good faith, sufficiently pled a
wrongful “we don’t care about the risks” attitude.209 After a
thirty-seven day trial, in August 2005 Chandler wrote a lengthy
opinion absolving the directors of liability and further elaborating
on the meaning of a director’s good faith obligation.210 This issue
was important because directors could not be exculpated from
monetary liability if they failed to act in good faith.211 Exactly
how the concept of good faith meshed with the traditional
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, however, had not been made
particularly clear in Delaware at the time.212
206. No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).
207. See id. at *20, *22 (finding that irreparable harm may have occurred
but declining to issue an injunction because plaintiff did not sufficiently
establish the magnitude of harm).
208. Infra Part IV.A.2.
209. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch.
2003).
210. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch.
2005).
211. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012).
212. See In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 753 (“Decisions from the
Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery are far from clear with
respect to whether there is a separate fiduciary duty of good faith.”); Claire Hill
& Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of
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Chandler acknowledged that providing “a definitive and
categorical definition” of bad faith “would be difficult, if not
impossible.”213 But good faith, according to Chandler, requires
“honesty of purpose [and acting] in the best interests . . . of the
corporation.”214 He also stated that “intentional dereliction of
duty [or] a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities, is an
appropriate (although not the only) standard for . . . good
faith.”215
In mid-2006, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
Chandler’s rulings and wrote approvingly of his statements on
good faith.216 Late the same year, in Stone v. Ritter,217 the
supreme court again described good faith in near-identical terms
to those of Chancellor Chandler and, importantly, held that good
faith was not a separate duty but was a component of the duty of
loyalty.218 Thus, given widespread exculpation of directors for
duty of care breaches,219 personal liability for a breach of
fiduciary duty requires either classic self-dealing behavior or
“intentional” or “conscious” wrongdoing by a director.220 That is a
demanding standard. But the full implications of this doctrinal
development for the seemingly separate and distinctive Revlon
duty were unknown for another three years.
In 2009, the supreme court decided Lyondell Chemical Co. v.
Ryan.221 The court reversed the Chancery Court’s denial of
Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 338–43 (2009) (discussing
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty in Delaware and explaining the “duty of
good faith”).
213. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 755.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006)
(affirming the Delaware Court of Chancery’s judgment).
217. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
218. See id at 369–70 (“The failure to act in good faith may result in liability
because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a
condition ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’” (citation omitted)).
219. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing Section
102(b)(7)).
220. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70.
221. 970 A.2d 235, 237 (Del. 2009). For a comment on how Lyondell relates
to earlier decisions, see generally Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith in RevlonLand, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 581 (2010/2011).
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defendants’ motion for summary judgment and held that the
selling company directors had acted properly under Revlon.222
The court noted that there is only one Revlon duty—“to [get] the
best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”223 And
the court quoted from Barkan v. Amsted Industries Inc.224 that
“there is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its
duties.”225 Turning to the all-important issue of director liability
for money damages for breaching the Revlon duty, and noting
that in a liability case “the analysis is very different,”226 the court
adopted the larger good faith concept of the Disney and Stone
decisions. Liability thus depended on plaintiffs showing that
directors in the Revlon setting—however triggered—were
“intentionally disregarding their duties.”227
But the court went further in explaining just how difficult it
would be under that standard to find directors personally liable
for their conduct in Revlon mode. The court stated that such a
showing, in the transactional context, required an “extreme set of
facts.”228 And directors would be liable in the M&A setting, the
court observed, only “if they knowingly and completely failed to
undertake their responsibilities.”229 The appropriate judicial
inquiry should thus be whether “directors utterly failed to
attempt to obtain the best sale price.”230
Both the actual words and the clear “music” of the Lyondell
opinion imposed a demanding liability standard for challenging
director conduct in the Revlon setting. Thus, in the nearly
quarter century from Revlon to Lyondell, the court—with a little

222. Id. at 244.
223. Id. at 242.
224. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
225. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 242–43 (quoting Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286).
226. Id. at 243.
227. Id.; see Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083–84 (Del. 2001)
(stating that although Revlon “imposes enhanced judicial scrutiny on certain
transactions,” plaintiffs must “plead sufficient facts to support the underlying
claims for a breach of fiduciary duties in conducting the sale” (citation omitted)).
228. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009).
229. Id. at 243–44.
230. Id. at 244; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing
the Novell decision’s use of a straightforward bad faith analysis in the corporate
sale setting).
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help from the General Assembly231—substantially redrew the
director liability landscape on both the duty of care and duty of
loyalty fronts, and then fitted the pre-existing Revlon doctrine
into the larger arc of those fiduciary developments.
In light of Lyondell, continuing assertions about the Revlon
duty imposing a higher “reasonableness” standard of scrutiny
than ordinary business judgment rule review, and requiring that
directors carry an initial burden of proof,232 are, in the personal
liability context, outworn and faulty doctrinal vestiges. Today, to
hold directors personally liable for damages, all plaintiffs, in all
types of cases, must allege deliberate wrongdoing to state a claim
for breaching the good faith component of the duty of loyalty.233
231. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012) (permitting a corporation
to include, in its certificate of incorporation, a provision eliminating or limiting
the personal liability of a director of the corporation for a breach of the duty of
care).
232. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45
(Del. 1993) (stating that board action in such a circumstance “is subject to
enhanced scrutiny”); Koehler v. Netspend Holdings, Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013
WL 2181518, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (noting that “[e]nhanced scrutiny
under Revlon is a test of reasonableness, which is ‘more searching than
rationality review’” (citation omitted)); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (noting that, the initial burden of proof
is placed on the target board of directors to prove “they had reasonable grounds
for believing there was a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, a burden
satisfied by a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation” (citing Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985))).
233. Supra notes 215–20 and accompanying text; see also In re BioClinica,
Inc. S’holders Litig., Civil Action No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233, at *5–6
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (finding that the only way for plaintiffs to pursue postclosing monetary damages claim was for directors to knowingly and completely
fail to undertake their responsibilities). Thus, we respectfully disagree with
Vice-Chancellor Laster’s recent statement that Revlon is a standard of judicial
review. See Laster, supra note 14, at 6 (“Revlon does not establish special duties
or impose particular conduct obligations on directors. Rather, it is a standard of
review under which the extent of judicial deference given to board decisions
narrows from rationality to range-of-reasonableness.”). In damages actions, the
demanding Lyondell standard is the relevant review standard. We question too
the utility of the supposed distinction between “standard of conduct” and
“standard of review” that Laster seeks to build on. See generally Lyman
Johnson, Unsettledness In Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule,
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 (2013) (arguing that Delaware courts
should directly focus on fiduciary duties when analyzing director, officer, and
shareholder wrongdoing). But even by Laster’s own definition of standard of
review, Lyondell sets the pertinent review standard in the damages setting.
Laster, supra note 14, at 25 & n.96.
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This is true whether the defendant directors were operating in an
M&A setting or in some completely different setting. This deftly
harmonizes, on the money damages issue, Revlon review with the
larger, recent thrust of Delaware fiduciary duty doctrine.
Moreover, this also means that, if Revlon applies even in a nodeal context, as we have argued above, directors now face the
same reduced level of personal liability risk in both the done-deal
and the no-deal contexts. This is because of the singular, allembracing liability standard for directors that emerged only long
after Revlon and its formative progeny first appeared. In turn,
this development would seem to provide further support for (or at
least remove an objection to) our view that the no-deal scenario
coherently fits within the Revlon doctrine, and that Revlon itself
has now been absorbed, on the damages issue, into a later, more
comprehensive liability standard.
Compelling as is this effort to achieve a larger unity with
respect to both the contours of the Revlon doctrine on the donedeal/no-deal issue, and the way in which Revlon fits into
Delaware’s modern fiduciary jurisprudence, it does not entirely
achieve congruence. There remains a distinctive if narrow thrust
to Revlon that differentiates the M&A setting from all others and
that also sharply distinguishes the done-deal from the no-deal
scenario even within the M&A milieu. This is developed below.
B. Revlon as a Pre-closing Remedies Doctrine
As noted earlier, virtually all sizeable M&A transactions are
challenged in court, some several times.234 Moreover, most of
these cases are settled without monetary payments and typically
are brought after a deal is struck but before it is finalized.235 At
234. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (detailing the number of
stockholder challenges to M&A transactions in 2012). The 2013 Dell buyout was
the subject of over twenty lawsuits. See Phil Milford, Icahn’s Fast-Track
Hearing on Dell Share Buyout Delayed, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2013, 11:20 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-12/dell-investor-icahn-seeks-fasttrack-status-for-lawsuit.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (“Shareholders have
sued Dell officials in federal court in Houston and at least 20 other Delaware
suits seeking more money are pending.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
235. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 1, at 6 (detailing statistics about
the number of settlements that occur and how many settlements result in
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this stage, plaintiffs seek initial relief other than damages.
Consequently, the tougher monetary liability standard of
Lyondell is not directly at play. In this preliminary injunction
setting, therefore, Revlon’s higher reasonableness standard of
review seems to remain pertinent,236 along with an initial director
burden of proof,237 unlike the case in the subsequent personal
liability stage where these aspects are outmoded after Lyondell.
This reveals that the stricter Revlon doctrine may continue to
have robust legal force, but only in preliminary injunction (not
damages) actions, suggesting its true current ex post role is as a
limited remedies doctrine, narrowly applicable pre-closing to
permit a grant of nonmonetary sanctions and to shape ensuing
settlement negotiations. Even assigning Revlon this reduced role
may be according it far too much credit, however.
In recent years, the chancery court consistently has refused
to grant injunctive relief on Revlon claims in the pre-closing
context. For the years beginning in 2008 through December 2013,
of fifteen reported decisions by the chancery court involving a
request for an injunction on a Revlon theory, only one such
injunction was granted.238 The injunction, moreover, involved a
conflicted financial advisor, and it did not halt the transaction
but only delayed a shareholder meeting for twenty days.239 The
monetary benefit). This is not to say plaintiff shareholders cannot and will not
seek to enjoin, prior to a deal, certain director and officer negotiating conduct
thought likely to lead to a suboptimal and underpriced transaction. Id. at 11.
This happened in mid-2013 with respect to a possible sale of Dole Food
Company. See Glasser, supra note 26 (detailing the lawsuits filed against Dole
Food Company, Inc.). Even before a definitive merger agreement was signed
between seller Dole and buyer Robert Murdock, a 40% shareholder and CEO of
Dole, shareholders sued to block any possible transaction, asserting that “the
purchase price was inadequate” and that any deal “would be the product of a
flawed merger process.” Id. Such claims seem rather obviously not to present a
justiciable controversy until a deal is signed, which happened only on August
12, 2013. See Saabira Chaudhuri & Julie Jargon, CEO to Acquire Dole in
Sweetened $1.2 Billion Deal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2013, at B3 (discussing Dole
Food Company, Inc.’s agreement to be acquired by David Murdock).
236. See supra note 24 (citing representative cases of Revlon review).
237. See supra note 25 (citing representative cases of Revlon review showing
that directors have the initial burden of proof).
238. See infra Table A (collecting cases). The sole case in which the court
granted an injunction was In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, 25
A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).
239. In re Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 844.
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losing streak for plaintiffs continued in 2013.240 For example, in
May 2013, Vice Chancellor Glassock, citing similar rulings,
refused to enjoin a transaction prior to a shareholder vote where
plaintiffs demonstrated both a likelihood of success on the merits
and irreparable harm, because there was no alternative
transaction to consider.241 Tellingly, consistent with standard
preliminary injunction law, the plaintiff in these types of actions
has the burden of proof, not the defendants.242 Vice-Chancellor
Glassock found plaintiffs had satisfied that burden and that the
sales process was inadequate under Revlon but that, in balancing
the equities, the existence of a significant premium, coupled with
the lack of another bid, meant the shareholders should be
permitted to vote on the deal.243 Even when an injunction was
occasionally granted in a “done deal” context prior to 2008,
moreover, it sometimes was done for the limited purpose of only
temporarily delaying the shareholder vote so that investors could
be provided with additional information before voting.244 Overall
then, when seen as a limited, pre-closing remedies doctrine,

240. See, e.g., Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., Civil Action No. 8373VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *24 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (noting that despite
making a showing of “likelihood of success on the merits of her Revlon claim,”
the “[p]laintiff . . . failed to carry her burden of persuasion that the balance of
equities favors enjoining the deal”); In re Plains Exploration and Prod. Co.
S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 9,
2013) (“The [p]laintiffs’ efforts to enjoin the [m]erger must fail because they
have not established a reasonable probability of success on the merits of either
their Revlon claim or their duty of candor claims.”).
241. See Koehler, 2013 WL 2181518, at *23–24 (citing cases where the
chancery court refused to enjoin transactions under similar circumstances).
“This Court has, in prior cases, refused to enjoin a premium transaction
notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs had demonstrated likely success on the
merits of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and the threat of irreparable
harm.” Id. (referring in part to In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432,
447 (Del. Ch. 2012), in which the court found that the plaintiff would likely
prevail on the merits and that it faced irreparable harm, but declining to
provide injunctive relief where no rival bid exists).
242. Supra note 136.
243. See Koehler, 2013 WL 2181518, at *23–24 (denying plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction because the “[p]laintiff . . . failed to carry her
burden of persuasion that the balance of the equities favors enjoining the deal”).
244. See, e.g., In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171,
209–10 (Del. Ch. 2007) (granting the motion for preliminary injunction until the
Netsmart board disclosed certain information).
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Revlon may offer scant relief even in that setting, regardless of
whether its strictures seem pretty clearly to have been violated.
Significantly, the “done-deal” setting is, in the pre-closing
context, starkly different than the “no deal” scenario. In the
latter, there is no deal to enjoin. Thus, even if the no-deal
scenario is indeed sensibly regarded as still triggering Revlon
duties—as we believe it is, for the doctrinal and policy reasons
identified in Part III—it has no salience for remedies. As to
damages, a plaintiff in a no-deal case, like any Revlon plaintiff—
indeed, like any plaintiff—must overcome the formidable
Lyondell standard.245 As to injunctive relief, however, there being,
by definition, no proposed transaction in the no-deal context,
there simply is nothing to enjoin. Thus, faulty director behavior
in the M&A setting that nonetheless produces a transaction is at
least potentially immediately sanctionable—perhaps even halted,
however unlikely that outcome—compliments of Revlon, while
faulty director conduct in an M&A setting that does not produce a
transaction is not. If director failure in the latter setting
threatens to imperil the financial well-being of the company,
there is little, from a fiduciary duty standpoint, that a
shareholder (or other stakeholder) can do at that stage.
Moreover, it is unclear how Revlon bears on director behavior
where, having entered the Revlon mode, directors seek to exit it
because of an improved company outlook. If Revlon is triggered
because directors did make a determined effort to sell corporate
control or effectuate a break-up, Revlon teaches that maximizing
immediate shareholder value is the only appropriate metric for
evaluating director conduct.246 But in deciding whether to
continue a sales process or halt it, in light of brightening
company prospects, may directors, once in Revlon mode, consider
the well-being of the corporate enterprise itself (or long-term
shareholder value) or must they stay riveted solely on short-term
shareholder value?247 Courts and M&A lawyers have given no
answer to this question, or even asked it.
By approaching Revlon from this remedies perspective, we
see two important points. First, the boundary puzzle of what
245.
246.
247.

See supra notes 221–30 and accompanying text (analyzing Lyondell).
Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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sensibly and doctrinally falls inside and outside the Revlon mode
still remains. That is to say, the longstanding issue of what
particular forms of done deals will and will not trigger Revlon
persists.248 And the even more basic boundary question of
whether an attempted (but failed) sales effort similarly triggers
Revlon review reveals a profound doctrinal shortcoming—i.e.,
directors who set out to sell a company may be assessed
differently, and face different sanctions, based on whether they
succeed or not. That is a puzzling and highly unsatisfying
outcome, both as a matter of sound doctrine and good policy. It
reveals, however, the general inability of courts to deal with
corporate inaction, even within the confined context of an
attempted but failed or abandoned transaction. Second, by
adopting a remedies perspective on this issue we see that the
stakes in the entire ongoing Revlon debate are, in fact, much
smaller than imagined: ex post, only pre-closing relief is up for
grabs anyway. The Revlon doctrine today may retain a certain
cosmetic luster, but it lacks remedial clout. In light of Revlon’s
diminished significance, an appraisal of the doctrine’s remaining
value is in order.
C. The Remnants of Revlon
The Revlon doctrine has, since its inception, taken on a
doctrinally insular life of its own.249 The various intradoctrinal
developments associated with the unfolding Revlon doctrine have,
regrettably, obscured the larger story of its overall
marginalization. Using a remedies vantage point, we see that
Revlon carries no special significance for damages claims and is
most germane to pre-closing relief in “done deals.” Even there,
almost invariably no remedy is granted. Thus, as an ex post
remedies matter, Revlon has dramatically faded in usefulness. In
light of that conclusion, we make several observations about
Revlon and what the tale of its decline teaches us.
First, we have emphasized the ex post remedies perspective
on Revlon. But there also is an ex ante frame of reference that
248. See supra notes 11–14, 37–40 and accompanying text (describing
scholarly attacks on Revlon jurisprudence).
249. See supra Part II (tracing the development of Revlon doctrine).
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sheds light on its enduring, if more modest, value in today’s M&A
practice and law. Presumably, when directors make a considered
decision to sell a company as the best strategic option, they fully
intend to succeed in that course of action. Success, of course, is
not entirely within their control. But to the considerable extent
that directors do influence events, their aim is to sell, assuming
that, after running a good process, such a strategic alternative
remains superior to any other.
Given the Revlon value-maximizing goal in that setting, one
might argue that it is in equity investors’ interests for directors to
believe that their conduct will be closely scrutinized for
reasonableness if a deal is struck, at least pre-closing if not in a
later damages action. Gauging their conduct against such a
higher than normal benchmark—because they are so advised by
legal counsel—may, ex ante, result in better performance. It is
behaviorally doubtful that directors who have carefully decided to
sell would slack off for the reason that if they perform poorly
enough no deal will be done at all, obviating any injunctive
action. And performance that is too deficient might run afoul of
even Lyondell’s tough damages standard. Thus, believing that,
having decided to sell, their conduct will be more closely
scrutinized than usual, and that they may shoulder a burden of
proof, directors may perform best if they believe the done deal
and no-deal outcomes will be reviewed under the same standard,
even if remedies may differ. Perhaps this will lead to better effort
throughout the sale process before it is known (or even knowable)
whether or not a deal can be struck.
As one example of this prophylactic effect on sales practices,
in 2013 numerous agreed deals included “go shop” provisions that
permitted the selling company directors to actively seek higher
bids post-signing.250 These were included in acquisition
agreements for Dell, Dole, and Steinway, for example.251 In the
250. Michael Glasser, M&A Terms: Go-Shops Remain Critical to
Maximizing Shareholder Value in a Flat Market, BUS. LAW CURRENTS (Oct. 2,
2013), https://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Article.aspx?id=76d18fab-7a50-436
1-bbcd-a6c53c1c9b8e&cid=&src=&sp= (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (“Go-shop
provisions were imperative to ensure that the CEOs of Dell and Dole maximized
shareholder value in light of the conflicts of interest present in the deals.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
251. Id.
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Dole deal, no rival bid emerged, while in the Dell and Steinway
sales, alternative bids were generated.252 The Dell agreement
expressly linked the go-shop provision to the directors expressed
goal of seeking “to ensure the best outcome for shareholders.”253
That, of course, is the gist of Revlon.
To be sure, such an ex ante outlook invites the question of
whether, lacking meaningful correlative remedial relief, Revlon
remains a legally enforceable directive at all rather than a
customarily adhered to but ultimately nonenforceable norm or
mere aspirational standard. But that discontinuity may exist
more generally in the fiduciary duty area. The duty of loyalty, for
example, generally and unremittingly demands that the best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders should be the
touchstone for director conduct.254 Yet, to obtain remedial relief
for breaching that duty, significant conflicts of interest or
deliberate wrongdoing are required.255 We do not ultimately
believe the ex ante rationale is sufficient to preserve Revlon as a
distinctive standard, but we allow that it has at least some force.
Second, although from a transactional lawyer’s counseling
perspective, Revlon may usefully guide advice-giving, the lack of
an ex post remedial payoff for plaintiffs’ lawyers seems to offer
them no incentive to bring cases at all, much less to challenge
virtually every transaction.256 Why press cases where money
damages and the granting of injunctive relief are so unlikely?
Indeed, why are more rather than fewer challenges being leveled
252. Id.
253. Id. In 2013, moreover, buyers are paying an average premium of 29%.
Stephen Grocer, Deals Are at a Premium, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2013, at C3 (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This suggests, at a time of high
company valuations, that selling company directors, generally, take seriously
the goal of obtaining a good sales price.
254. See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 71 (2003) (“[D]irectors in the decisionmaking context can (and should) emphasize the affirmative dimension of
loyalty, stressing the importance of identifying and then doing what is best for
the enterprise . . . not simply . . . refrain[ing] from disloyal behavior.” (emphasis
added)).
255. See supra notes 209–20, 226–30 and accompanying text (explaining
that the remedial relief to breaching the duty of loyalty generally requires
director self-dealing or intentional disregard of duties).
256. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 1, at Highlights (“Attorney fee
awards in disclosure-only settlements have decreased since 2009.”).
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against deals in recent years, the very period over which the
likelihood of a remedy has slackened?257
This is a puzzle. Possibly, the M&A litigation market is
inefficient and the probability of failure has not been quantified,
leading to an overproduction of lawsuits problem. More likely,
Revlon cases retain pre-closing settlement value and obtaining
modest, nonmonetary relief258—such as additional disclosure—
may be sufficient to induce resolution and also warrant courtapproved attorneys’ fees in an overall settlement. This does
relatively little for investors, of course, but it does benefit
plaintiffs’ lawyers. On the defense side, such fees are just a
bothersome but necessary transaction cost to settle an action and
move it to closing.259 Defense lawyers may lack a reason to resist
even if they fully appreciate the low likelihood of a remedial
sanction under Revlon. Winning is costly, time-consuming, and
introduces heightened risk of not closing. Thus, while plaintiffs’
fees have gone down in settled cases in recent years,260 only if, as
was done recently,261 courts more closely monitor the granting of
attorneys’ fees, will this ingrained practice subside.
257. See supra notes 1–2 (indicating an upsurge in litigation since 2005).
258. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (explaining how the vast
majority of lawsuits settle with disclosure-only accords).
259. The average time between filing a lawsuit and approval of a settlement
is a mere 42 days in these types of cases. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 1, at
5.
260. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 1, at 9.
261. For example, in a letter ruling in March 2013, Vice-Chancellor
Glasscock was asked to approve a settlement in In re PAETEC Holding Corp.
Shareholder Litigation, Civil Action No. 6761-VCG, 2013 WL 1110811 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 19, 2013). See Andrew J. Noreuil, Will Recent Decisions of the Delaware
Chancery Court Finally Curb Excessive M&A Litigation?, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 9,
2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b50ad233-b4c3-4521-bde9c74219 072905 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (discussing several 2013 cases from
Delaware Chancery Court) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
In the proposed settlement, the court noted that, as is customary, the
defendants agreed not to oppose a fee request by plaintiffs’ counsel up to a
specified amount. Id. Vice-Chancellor Glasscock rejected plaintiffs’ argument
that judicial scrutiny of unopposed fee requests was inappropriate. Id.
Expressing concern about plaintiffs obtaining trivial benefits due to defendants’
desires to obtain a release of claims, Glasscock found, with one exception, that
the additional agreed disclosures did not warrant any attorneys’ fees. Id.
Chancellor Strine, in a March 2013 ruling that denied an unopposed motion to
settle a shareholder action because it did not provide sufficient benefits to
justify a release of claims, also declined to certify the class and denied the
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Third, the chronicling of Revlon’s unacknowledged decline is
a cautionary tale about keeping a more dynamic, allencompassing perspective on particularized fiduciary doctrines,
in light of larger doctrinal shifts. Relatedly, Delaware courts
frequently, if gradually, rework earlier precedents into the larger
fabric of their developing fiduciary jurisprudence.262 During the
transition, a particular doctrine may appear to express more legal
force than it carries in reality. The Revlon doctrine, when viewed
in silo-like isolation, thus seems to retain unusually robust
rhetorical force; but it actually has been drained of genuine
remedial clout. This phenomenon may itself portend imminent
change.
Finally, Revlon’s central teaching on short-term value
maximization may be ripe for rethinking. Chancellor Strine has
referred to “Revlon’s myopic focus on immediate value”263 and
asked why, subject to complying with the duty of loyalty, a board
of directors should not be free to “choose the deal it believed was
best on a long-term basis for stockholders.”264 Furthermore, the
immediate share price maximization norm may not be so easily
cabined within the sale of company context. It may seep into the
larger corporate milieu, and lead directors to overly focus on short
term rather than long-term considerations even when not in the
sale setting.
Certainly, at the time Revlon was decided, and continuing
thereafter,265 Delaware courts have routinely stated that the
proper corporate objective was to act in the best interests of the
application for attorneys’ fees. In re Transatl. Holdings Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A.
No. 6574-CS, 2013 WL 1191738, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013).
262. See, e.g., Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in
Director Conduct: Are Delaware Courts Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go
Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531, 562–63 (2005)
(discussing how the Delaware Chancery Court approached the development of a
corporate good faith doctrine); see generally Johnson, supra note 56 (describing
how the common law method of judicial decisionmaking serves to signal future
changes).
263. In re Synthes S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1048 n.117 (Del. Ch. 2012).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985) (recognizing that a board is to act in the best interests of the corporation
and its stockholders); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37, 41 (Del.
Ch. 2013) (“[T]he duty of loyalty therefore mandates that directors maximize the
value of the corporation over the long-term . . . .”).
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corporation and its stockholders over the long term, not the short
term. Whether the focus is short-term or long-term value,
however, courts are institutionally competent only to examine
whether, in pursuing the proper objective, directors fulfilled or
breached their fiduciary duties.266 Courts themselves cannot
otherwise monitor or mandate achievement of any stated
objective.267 It remains just that, an articulated objective or goal
for directors to pursue, to be assessed in light of alternative
courses of action. A corporate objective is not, however, an
enforceable and distinctive duty in its own right.268
To the extent Revlon is grounded on concerns about director
conflicts,269 traditional fiduciary duty doctrine is designed to
address such concerns, upon the usual showings, as seen in
Lyondell.270 And while several Delaware decisions analogize the
Revlon duty to a trustee’s duty to get the best price when selling
an asset,271 the parallel is inapt. Even in a corporate break-up
266. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43–
45 (Del. 1993) (stating that “[i]n the sale of control context, the directors must
focus on one primary objective—to secure the transaction offering the best value
reasonably available for the stockholders—and they must exercise their
fiduciary duties to further that end”).
267. The litigation between eBay and Craigslist made this clear. Former
Chancellor Chandler nullified certain of Craigslist’s defensive measures, but he
did not—and could not—alter its core business strategy of not charging for most
of its classified ad space. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1,
35 (Del. Ch. 2010). Although Vice-Chancellor Laster refers to eBay, he does not
point out that the decision did not alter that company’s approach to conducting
its business in a non-maximizing of profits manner. Laster, supra note 14, at 27.
268. For this reason, we disagree with Laster that a corporate objective—
whatever it might be—necessarily is the same as (or an aspect of) the directors’
fiduciary duty of loyalty. See Laster, supra note 14, at 25–26 (arguing that the
directors’ objective of maximizing shareholder value is part of the duty of
loyalty). Corporate goals or objectives are distinct from fiduciary duties.
269. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch.
2012) (recognizing that Revlon was animated by concerns that directors’ “actions
are not compromised by impermissible considerations, such as self-interest”); In
re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010) (identifying
Revlon’s “heightened scrutiny” as “rooted in a concern that the board might
harbor personal motivations . . . that differ from what is best for the corporation
and its stockholders”). Inasmuch as Revlon also was grounded on the director
duty of care, the existence of director conflicts is not the sole policy rationale of
that decision. See Manesh, supra note 12, at 2.
270. See supra notes 221–30 and accompanying text (discussing Lyondell).
271. See Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co. Inc., C.A. No. 1091-VCL, 2013
WL 458373, at *2 n.3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013) (“Although the value-maximizing
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transaction, it is not individual assets that are being sold; it is a
business unit or division, having distinctive value as an intact
business. And in a sale of stock deal, the corporation as an entity
is likewise being sold intact, not as a parceling out of individual
assets. As for directors being “trustees” for shareholders in the
sale of their individually held stock, that simply is not the nature
of the director-shareholder relationship. Moreover, Delaware has
never articulated a “trustee-like” duty when corporate directors
act to purchase another company, even though a large majority of
acquisitions fail,272 to the detriment of shareholders.
Consequently, the usual metric of asking whether directors
complied with their fiduciary duties in assessing which, of several
possible strategic options, was best for the corporation as a
business (whether as a whole or in units) and its shareholders
remains feasible and appropriate.273
If a sharper focus on shareholder benefit is preferred to an
emphasis on the interests of the company itself, the proper metric
is the best available option for shareholders over the long term. If
principle is typically associated with [Revlon], it is not unique to that context.”);
In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 999 (Del. Ch. 2005) (noting
that the obligation to maximize stockholder value “is rooted in old trust
principles”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time, Inc., No. 10866, 1989 WL
79880, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 741 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (“Revlon was not a
radical departure from existing Delaware, or other, law (i.e., it has ‘always’ been
the case that when a trustee or other fiduciary sells an asset for cash, his duty is
to seek the single goal of getting the best available price) . . . .”); Freedman v.
Rest. Assocs. Indus., Inc., No. 9212, 1987 WL 14323, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 661
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987) (“The bedrock principle that a board owes a duty to
shareholders to act only in pursuit of their interests is the principle that
explains Revlon.”). Chancellor Allen went on to note in Freedman v. Restaurant
Associates Industries, Inc., that “[w]here the company is to be sold, it cannot be
in conformity with that obligation to defeat a higher offer in favor of a lower one
regardless of other considerations. So understood, Revlon is consistent with a
very long line of cases.” Id.; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion:
Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW.
919, 927 n.25 (2001) (stating that “[t]he Revlon principle grows out of the
traditional principle that fiduciaries must sell trust assets for their highest
value” (citing Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 200 A.2d 441, 448 (Del. 1964);
Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46, 49 (Del. Ch. 1924))).
272. See generally PETER CLARK & ROGER MILLS, MASTERMINDING THE DEAL
(2013).
273. See supra note 265 (observing that the standard by which directors are
evaluated for duty of loyalty purposes is whether they are acting in the “best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders”).
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directors believe a high premium sales price is superior to
operating independently, they still presumably are and should be
making that assessment based on what they consider to be the
best way to derive value from the business for shareholders over
the long run. In certain cases, that time horizon may mean
procuring the best sales price now, but in many cases it means
not selling. The long-term time horizon remains the same,
however. Where there are two or more bids in the sale context—
the facts in the Revlon and QVC cases—if a sale, rather than
operating independently, sincerely is thought to be the best way
to derive value, then obviously the better of the two bids is value
maximizing, but only after the sale option is first determined to
be the best value-maximizing option, compared to all others, over
the long run. In this way, the overall director objective always is
to achieve the best long-term value; when that goal is best
achieved via a sale, the best sale price by definition achieves the
greatest long-term value. If that is all that Revlon and its progeny
mean, it is misleading to focus only on the value-maximization
aspect of the sale itself, and neglect the fact that that very choice
must itself, first, be determined to be the best way to maximize
long term value.274
Delaware’s substantial weakening of Revlon’s remedial
impact, while, at the same time, rhetorically adhering to its
stiffer standards, suggests a judicial willingness to harmonize
Revlon not only with larger fiduciary doctrine, as we have argued,
but perhaps to align it as well on the underlying corporate
objective issue. The aim may be to eventually synchronize the
corporate objective whether a company is or is not for sale, thus
entirely obviating any per se concern as to whether a company is
or is not in Revlon mode.275 Revlon would then become irrelevant,
not just insipid.

274. For Vice-Chancellor Laster’s recent and very helpful explanation of this
line of analysis, see In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch.
2013) (discussing the “perpetual existence” of Delaware corporations and the
resulting implications for long-term value considerations). See also Andrew A.
Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 777–83 (2012)
(emphasizing the long history of precedent supporting a long-term value focus
for corporate action).
275. This is the upshot of Vice-Chancellor Laster’s recent argument as well.
See generally Laster, supra note 14. However, he does so by extending Revlon
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Two developments may hasten this reconsideration. First, a
2013 amendment to Delaware’s merger statute will permit sales
transactions to go forward without a shareholder vote, under
certain conditions.276 In those types of deals, Delaware judges will
not be able at the injunction stage to sidestep likely Revlon
breaches and rule that shareholders should be permitted to vote
on the approved deal—there will be no such vote. The judges will
then have to grapple with whether apparent violations of Revlon,
coupled with director exculpation for duty of care breaches, will
lead them to enjoin a board-approved deal. Provided that no other
deal is on the scene, and that the directors did nothing wrong
defensively under Unocal to preclude a rival bid,277 it is hard to
believe courts will not defer to a deal approved by an independent
board.
Second, Delaware’s new benefit corporation statute permits
electing “benefit corporations” to expressly advance a blend of
investor and other interests.278 Directors must balance the
interests of shareholders, the interests of those affected by the
corporation’s conduct, and an articulated public benefit.279
Certainly, when those types of companies are sold, investor
interests will not need to be paramount, and Revlon and its
progeny likely will have no application to them. But the rise of
benefit corporations may also prompt Delaware courts to
reexamine the rightful claim of investor interests in regular
business corporations, both in relation to the corporation’s
institutional interests as a business enterprise and with respect
into all sale settings, whereas we do so by curtailing and abandoning Revlon’s
misguided emphasis on immediate value maximization.
276. Subject to certain conditions, Section 251(h) of the Delaware
Corporation Law was amended, effective as of August 1, 2013, to permit a
merger without a shareholder vote if, following a tender offer, the offeror owns
at least the percentage of each class of target company stock required to approve
a merger. Abbe Dienstag, et al., DGCL § 251(h): Recent Change to Delaware Law
(Sept.
13,
2013),
Facilitates
Two-Step
Mergers,
LEXOLOGY
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=def937a9-ee43-40a9-9ab1-85869
3d70759 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (2012); 79 Del. Laws, c. 72, § 6
(2013) (inserting § 251(h) into Title 8 of the Delaware Code).
277. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985).
278. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2012).
279. Id. § 365.
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to whether boards should ever be directed by courts to manage
companies to benefit shareholders over the short term rather
than the long run. In other words, Delaware courts should speak
to why Revlon demands, if it still does, a different corporate
objective than the normal long-term focus. As we have
emphasized, however, far more important than what courts say,
is what, from a remedies perspective, they actually do.280
V. Conclusion
Over the past several years, we observe a paradox in M&A
deal litigation. The number of challenges to done deal
transactions has risen dramatically, but the number of successful
Revlon claims—those procuring a judicial remedy—has
plummeted. Evidently, there is either an information inefficiency
in the lawsuit market about the dismal success rate, or plaintiffs
(and their counsel) are imposing a transaction cost on moving
deals from signing to closing that defendants seem willing to
pay.281 Only stricter judicial monitoring of attorneys’ fees can
alter that dynamic.
The larger untold story we have traced in this article is the
dwindling of a cornerstone legal doctrine. Having set out to
suggest, as a theory and policy matter, that Revlon might
sensibly be extended into the no-deal context, we conclude,
ironically, that there is little remedial clout to the Revlon doctrine
in any setting. We should acknowledge this decline and stop
regarding Revlon as a robust doctrine. This would address
Chancellor Strine’s recent complaint about the “now too common
invocation of the iconic Revlon case.”282 Delaware courts should go
further, however. They should, for the reasons stated,
forthrightly reject Revlon’s faulty focus on short-term value

280. See supra Part IV.B.
281. The “transaction cost” could include lower bids by buyers overall if they
fear some, however modest, exposure to aiding and abetting liability and related
defense costs. See Malpiede v. Towson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095–96 (Del. 2001)
(describing the elements of an aiding and abetting claim).
282. In re Morton’s Rest. Grp. S’holder Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 676 (Del. Ch.
2013).
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maximization.283 Then the corporate objective in the sale
setting—of whatever kind—would be the same as it is (and
should be) outside the sale setting: to pursue the best option for
achieving long-term value.

283. A recent academic study concluded that “our results are most
consistent with the view that public firms’ investment decisions are affected by
managerial short-terminism.” JOHN ASKER, ET AL., CORPORATE INVESTMENT AND
STOCK
MARKET
LISTING:
A
PUZZLE?
27
(2013),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603484 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Possibly, Revlon’s 1986 emphasis on
immediate value maximization in certain sale settings has, regrettably, seeped
into the larger corporate milieu.
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TABLE A
Reported Delaware Preliminary Injunction Actions
Scrutinized Under Revlon
January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2013

Case

Single
bidder?

Injunction
granted on
Revlon
claim?

1.

David P. Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Margolis, C.A. No.
3694–VCN, 2008 WL 5048692 (Del. Ch. Jun. 27, 2008)

Multiple

Denied

2.

Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc.,
11 A.3d 1175 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010)

Unclear

Denied

3.

In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch.
Sep. 8, 2010)

Multiple

Denied

4.

In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 5, 2010)

Multiple

Denied

5.

In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holder Litig., 25 A.3d 813
(Del. Ch. Feb 14, 2011)

Single

Granted

6.

In re Atheros Commc’ns, Inc., C.A. No. 6124–VCN, 2011
WL 864928 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011)

Multiple

Denied

7.

In re Answers Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6170–VCN,
2011 WL 1366780 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011)

Single

Denied

8.

In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6373–
VCN, 2011 WL 1938253 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011)

Single

Denied

9.

In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A.
No. 6164–VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 20,
2011)

Single

Denied

10. In re OPENLANE, Inc., C.A. No. 6849–VCN, 2011 WL
4599662 (Del. Ch. Sep. 30, 2011)

Single

Denied

11. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 29, 2012)

Single

Denied

12. In re Micromet, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 7197–VCP,
2012 WL 681785 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012)

Single

Denied

THE DWINDLING OF REVLON

227

Single
bidder?

Injunction
granted on
Revlon
claim?

13. In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7144–
VCG, 2012 WL 729232 (Del. Ch. Mar 06, 2012)

Single

Denied

14. In re Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig.,
C.A. No. 8090–VCN, 2013 WL 1909124 (Del. Ch. May 9,
2013)

Single

Denied

15. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 8373–VCG,
2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013)

Single

Denied

Case

